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Policies and regulations, such as the European Union General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (EU GDPR), have been enforced to protect personal data from abuse during
storage and processing. We design and implement a prototype scheme that could
1) provide a public ledger of policy compliance to help the public make informative
decisions when choosing data services; 2) provide support to the organizations for
identifying violations and improve their ability of compliance. Honest organizations
could then benefit from their positive records on the public ledger. To address the
scalability problem inherent in the Blockchain-based systems, we develop algorithms
and leverage state channels to implement an on-chain-hash-off-chain data structure.
We identify the verification of the information from the external world as a criti-
cal problem when using Blockchains as public ledgers, and address this problem by
the incentive-based trust model implied by state channels. We propose the Verifi-
able Off-Chain Message Channel as the integrated solution for leveraging blockchain
technology as a general-purpose recording mechanism and support our thesis with
performance experiments. Finally, we suggest a sticky policy mechanism as the evi-
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In current networked services, personal data is collected by the service providers for
analysis, acquiring insights of the market, customized service provision, etc. The
users may upload data to online service for storage or sharing information within
community (e.g., Facebook, Dropbox). Because of the growing volume of personal
data exposed on the Internet (either passively or actively), the protection against
data abuse has become highly critical. Regulations such as European Union General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) were enforced to protect personal data from
abuse during storage and processing. However, the public is hardly able to know
whether the organizations who process their data are properly compliant with the
policies. Disclosure of violations are usually in the form of breaking scandals. Data
abuse or breaches take place not just in untrustworthy organizations. Unfortunately,
well-known cases of data leakage or misuse are related to famous names of
companies that are considered responsible organizations by the society (e.g.
Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal). Even worse, organizations usually
react to such events passively, concealing the truth from the sight of the public. In
2017, Yahoo admitted 3 billion user accounts had been compromised in their data
breach scandal which was disclosed in 2013, but at the moment of the exposure,
they only announced 500 million users impacted.
While the news of data leakage build up the mental tension of the public,
there is no easy solution to achieve absolute security as the public may desire.
Therefore, a more feasible way is to make the data usage transparent and auditable
so that the users could make informative decisions when choosing a service. From
the experience of other industry sectors, transparency would only benefit an area
rather than undermine its credibility, though organizations may hesitate to do so at
the beginning. Transparency allows the users more reaction time to limit the
[2]
damage; and if auditable records exist, the users could measure and compare the
risks of choosing different service providers. On the other hand, the organizations
could benefit from a relatively positive record; and the records could serve as
evidence to which the organizations are able to price their effort on data protection
accordingly.
Therefore, a transparent and auditable public ledger recording the
organization’s performance of data protection seems desirable not only to the
research society but also to the industry sectors in which information technology is
a significant building block. To record policy compliance is a direct approach. It
may seem intuitive at first glance, however, to build an applicable scheme is not a
trivial task, due to the complexity of the current computing environment. Over the
last few years, we have observed a rapid increase on the complexity of data usage
and transmission patterns, which are characterized by broaden categories of devices,
cross-platform data sharing, extensive adoption of outsourced processing,
distributed storage, etc.
To illustrate this complexity, consider the application scenario of social robot
(e.g., Jibo, Kuri, Olly, BIG-i, Zenbo). A social robot is a Cyber Physical System
(CPS) designed to reside in homes and act as personal assistant with a
“personality” that makes it feel like a human companion [1]. In a typical case, the
social robot is not meant to be used in isolation, but in close communication with
robot manufacturer’s cloud service, in order to separate expensive computations
from the robot’s hardware. This design pattern is common in current light weight
devices to reduce the market price and support powerful functionality. In a smart
home setting, a social robot is expected act as a central controller so that it will be
communicating with Internet of Things (IoT) devices directly or indirectly. Several
of the social robot companies plan to or have already released a software
development kit (SDK) for interested parties to create add-on robot skills, which
[3]
Figure 1.1: The CPS with the social robot in a home setting.
will lead the robot to communicate with additional could services other than that of
the robot manufacturer.
In Fig.1.1, the robot manufacturer’s cloud is depicted as cloud A. Apart
from the robot’s cloud that was just described the user could also have the robot
exchange data with other clouds. Examples include Dropbox, Google Drive, and
Facebook. The robot’s company might even allow users to download add-on skills
from platforms such as Google Play. These types of cloud services are depicted as a
cluster of L clouds, in Fig.1.1.
The social robot will be just one of the devices sending or receiving data
from the group of those L clouds. Smartphones, tablet and laptop devices found in
a household today are often already connected to some of the L clouds. In addition,
the user might desire these personal devices to exchange data with the social robot.
For instance, the robot could send pictures taken with its camera through the
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) or electronic mail. Some robots that are
marketed not only as a friendly companion but also as a security patrol guard could























Figure 1.2: The risk of data management in IaaS cloud: 1) APP instance
multi-server duplication for load balancing, 2) VM cached for fast recovery or
migration, 3) APP and DATA backup on storage server, 4) Hypervisor could check
the memory of VMs
user might want to share information like the contacts address book from the phone
or personal computer to the social robot. The communication among the devices
illustrated in Fig.1.1 could involve the cellular network, the Internet Service
Provider’s (ISP) network or a wireless local network (e.g. WiFi, Bluetooth Low
Energy).
The introduction of a social robot in a home environment adds a significant
degree of complication to the business relationships and network connections
enabled in a smart home. Each of the mentioned clouds may be run by one entity as
a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), while a different administrative authority may be
supplying the Platform or Infrastructure-as-a-Service (PaaS or IaaS). It could also
be that the same IaaS (e.g., Amazon Web Services) is the layer below two different
SaaS clouds (e.g., the social robot’s cloud and an IoT device’s cloud).
Given this complexity of connections and data movement, it is difficult to
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monitor whether the data is properly protected on every connection and site
because data will cross the boundary of domains, networks, platforms, and even
boundary of nations with different regulations. Even if online service providers are
generally trustworthy, their system could be misconfigured by the lack of
experiences to dealing with the ever growing complexity of current computation
environment. Fig.1.2 illustrates the execution model of an IaaS cloud and the
difficulty in managing data in such environment. The system level intervene by the
cloud infrastructure is out of the control of the service provider at the application
level. A useful public ledger of policy compliance should contain the information of
the entire view of data protection through the involved network.
In this dissertation, we propose a scheme that could provide a public ledger
of policy compliance. To achieve this objective, we leverage public Blockchains as
the public ledger. To address the scalability problem inherent in the
Blockchain-based systems, we utilize state channels to implement the
on-chain-hash-off-chain-data structure. We identify transaction verification as a
critical problem when using the Blockchains as the public ledgers, since Blockchain
is not as dependable as it is supposed to be in this scenario. We suggest a
verification mechanism for the information that out of the view of the blockchain
network, which is based on the incentive-based trust model implied by the state
channel model. Then we propose the Verifiable Off-Chain Message Channel
(VOCMC) as the integrated solution for leveraging blockchain technology as a
general purpose recording mechanism. As mentioned previously, the verification of
external information is critical for blockchain based public ledger, especially in the
scenario considered in this work, where the information published on the ledger
should be reliable. The VOCMC enable the verification of external information and
the integration of blockchain with powerful off-chain computation to overcome the
difficulty of scaling the blockchain. The VOCMC is derived from the state channel,
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and its name emphasises the objective of the dissertation, which is to provide an
approach to verify external information. On top of the VOCMC, we suggest a
mechanism combined with sticky policy [2] to provide cross-boundary policy
enforcement and monitoring, and thus a dependable and scalable public ledger for
policy compliance. The result can be a public auditable record of the policy
compliance, which can serve as the permanent immutable credit record of the
service provider for the customer making informative decisions.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.
• We first formalize the model of public ledger object and its verification
mechanism. We observe that the verification of a blockchain transaction can
be decoupled from the ledger object and in essence is part of the functionality
of the transaction system. Therefore, we formalize this concept by
self-verfiable transaction system, and thus prove its inability of verifying
external information (Chapter 2).
• Secondly, we discuss the definition of VOCMC by starting with the concept of
incentive-based trust. Briefly, if a piece of information is attached with an
incentive that leads to interest conflicts among different parties, their
agreement on what the information is could be a reliable description of the
information. Based on this concept, the VOCMC actively adds incentives to
the concerned external information and makes the participants of the channel
to reach agreements on the information as a verification process. We examine
the security properties under the universally composable security framework
(Chapter 3).
• We thirdly use VOCMC as the building block to construct the prototype of
public ledger of policy compliance, which combines off-chain database and
on-chain hash. How to determine whether a policy complies with regulations
[7]
is out of the discussion scope of this dissertation, though it is a core
mechanism. We assume that there exist a set of policies and a mechanism that
could effectively determine whether a system has successfully complied with
the polices in the set. We selected a representative policy set for concept
demonstration. We leverage the sticky policy to track the user data and collect
evidence required by the inference engine (Chapter 4).
• We evaluated the prototype to demonstrate its effectiveness on scaling
blockchain applications. We performed prototype experiments to determine
spacial and temporal overhead introduced by the implemented system as a
whole, and the monetary and performance cost of on-chain execution. Based
on these pilot tests, we examined how the off-chain component helps scale the
system. We also tested the effectiveness of the sticky policy mechanism on a
particular policy use case, the guaranteed deletion (Chapter 5).
The scalability of a blockchain system is the weakness for a lot of
blockchain-based applications. This issue is amplified when dealing with
micro-transactions in huge magnitude. Off-chain payment channels or state channels
are designed to address the difficulty in scaling the blockchain system. Though the
main objective of our proposed scheme is to provide verification of external
information for the public ledger, it naturally reliefs the tension the system may
suffer. At first glance, off-chain payment channels merge several micro-transactions
into a single on-chain transaction. From another perspective, this process can be
considered as reaching agreement on a sequence of computation results. In other
words, any on-chain computation can be executed by an off-chain process as long as
the result can be verified by the stakeholders, and reach an agreement on it. In
consequence, we can limit the usage of on-chain computations, such as the smart
contracts of Ethereum. The capacity of on-chain computation depends on the
available balance for computation, which is not appropriate for persistent programs.
[8]
Another side effect of executing code on-chain is the halting problem that would





Blockchain technology is attracting growing attention from both researchers and the
general public after its success in cryptocurrency and the participation of
governments and major financial industry players. Although blockchain and
cryptocurrency technologies are often mentioned together, they are not tautologies;
blockchain is only one of the cryptocurrency building blocks, albeit the most
important.
In general, a blockchain serves as a public ledger for recording transactions.
Transactions in Bitcoin are mainly exchanges of the cryptocurrency, from an
account to another. From this perspective, a blockchain seems like just another kind
of database. What makes blockchain interesting is its combination of technical facts
and non-technical facts to achieve several critical properties for establishing a
cryptocurrency.
In traditional banking, the transaction databases are maintained by
organizations that obtained trust from the public, usually endorsed by the
government or influential investors. Transaction databases are critical for banking
and we need trusted organizations to operate them, because the transaction records
are the only evidence of how the assets are located among millions of accounts. If
the transaction database is secured, the assets owned by accounts are secured. The
security of the transaction database depends on trusted organizations. However,
Bitcoin adopted a security model without the trusted authority, which is referred to
as a trusted third party in the majority of the security framework. The
abandonment of the trusted third party is painful, but the solution provided by
Nakamoto has not only solved the problem of establishing trust without trusted
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parties but also given fundamental support to the value of Bitcoin.
The rest of this chapter illustrates the general framework of the Bitcoin-like
cryptocurrencies, in order to explain what makes blockchain, a database technology,
important and interesting to both industry and academia. As we will see,
blockchain is a smart combination of existing technical and non-technical factors.
This strong coexistence means that it is difficult to decouple blockchain from the
cryptocurrency system for general purpose ledgers, and the performance challenges
are hard to overcome. The definitions and terminology introduced in this chapter
will support the discussion of later chapters.
2.2 The Bitcoin-like Blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology (DLT). The Bitcoin blockchain in
particular is based on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks in which every participating
node, called mining node, has to keep the entire transaction database and update its
local version as the data grows. As a result, multiple copies of the ledger exist in the
network. If the copies disagree about some transactions, how do they resolve the
issue and achieve agreement? This problem could refer to the consistency problem,
the consensus problem, or, more generally, the Byzantine fault tolerance
problem [3]. Inconsistent data is common in the Bitcoin-like blockchain. Suppose
every mining node follows the protocol and never crushes. Despite this ideal
execution environment, data inconsistency occurs due to the transfer latency across
the network.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates this type of data inconsistency. Two transactions (i.e.,
transaction R and transaction B) enter the network from nodes with high transfer
latency. Consider the two subnetworks. From the point of view of these
subnetworks, the arriving order of these transactions is different. Another type of










Figure 2.1: Transactions R and B enter the network from nodes with high transfer
latency. From the point-of-view of the red nodes (the nodes on the left side),
Transaction R arrived earlier than Transaction B, while blue nodes (the nodes on
the right) consider Transaction B as earlier than Transaction R.
Bitcoin-like blockchain is the fact that mining nodes may get offline and back
online, as every node could join and leave a P2P network anytime as they wish. As
a result, there may always be some nodes with an outdated version of the database.
The most important type of data inconsistency is caused by malicious nodes that
may alter the database for their benefits. In a decentralized system without a
trusted authority, it is difficult to identify if a copy of the database is without
fraudulent transactions.
In order to achieve data consistency in such a complex environment, the
Bitcoin-like blockchain relies on a protocol that tolerates Byzantine failure in that
the mining nodes’ behavior is, in essence, arbitrary and unpredictable, if the
malicious behaviors are considered as a set of failure cases with arbitrary
consequences. Nakamoto provided the original protocol in the Bitcoin white
paper [4], which includes several smart and correlated design decisions that enable
this scheme. Informally, the protocol has the following features:
• The transactions are recorded in a chained data structure, where the
[12]
transactions are arranged in blocks, and each block contains a field which is
the hash of the previous block—then the transaction blocks are chained by
this field.
• The value of a new coming transaction can be verified by the value of
transactions resident in the existing blocks whose value could again be verified
by earlier transactions.
• New blocks are generated through a competition process called mining. The
winning node gets rewarded by obtaining the ownership of new Bitcoins
accompanied by the new-born block.
• All the mining nodes must accept the longest chain as the valid version.
The ideas behind the blockchain are in fact older, and were formerly a
method for time-stamping digital documents. They were introduced by Haber and
Stonetta in a series of works beginning in the early 1990s [5, 6, 7]. By assembling
data into blocks and chaining the blocks with hash pointers, this structure provides
the feature of tamper-evident, as shown in Fig. 2.2. If an adversary had modified
data in any block of the chain, it would invalidate the hash pointers of every
following block. Technically, if we store the last valid hash pointer, the tampering
could be detected even if an adversary modified the data and all the corresponding
hash pointers in the chain. In centralized database architecture, the hash pointers
could be stored by a trusted authority; however, it is not the case for decentralized
systems like the blockchain.
The fundamental assumption behind Bitcoin-like blockchain is that there is
no trusted authority or trusted third party in the system. An individual mining
node has to keep its own copy of the blockchain. An observer cannot recognize
which copy is the valid one, if multiple copies are displayed since, from the











Figure 2.2: Every hash pointer depends on all the previous data and pointers. Once
a piece of data is tampered, the following hash pointers will become incorrect. If an
adversary attempts to modify the data, he has to re-compute every hash pointer
influenced by the modification. If there is a trusted authority keeping the record of
the correct value of the last hash, data tampering is always detectable, even if the
adversary modifies the data and hash pointers appropriately.
Imagine, blockchain A and B store the same data except for a single disagreed data
entry. Correspondingly, the hash pointers are differentiated between blockchain A
and B after that data entry. It is possible that B modified the data, or A did the
modification. However, there is no authentic version kept in a secure place; thus,
one could not tell which is the valid chain without modification.
Nakamoto innovatively solved this problem. Firstly, the generation of hash
pointers becomes a computationally difficult puzzle. As illustrated in Fig. 2.3, to
generate the hash pointer for a data block, the mining node has to find a string of
bit called nonce with which the generated hash pointer displays some required
patterns. In the Bitcoin system, the required pattern for a hash pointer is some
leading zeros in the generated hash. In order to find an answer to a puzzle for a
specific block, the mining nodes have to randomly select a nonce, then calculate the
resulted hash to verify if the hash meets the requirement. Repeat this cycle until a
valid nonce is found and thus a valid hash. This technical decision makes the hash
generation inefficient, and thus inefficient to regenerate the entire blockchain if a
piece of data is modified. An adversary has to successfully solve as many puzzles as
the number of blocks following the data he intends to change.
It is not enough to secure the valid blockchain by just raising the difficulty of
[14]
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Figure 2.3: In Bitcoin like blockchain, there is a field called nonce with which the
resulted hash of a block will demonstrate some required patterns. Currently, the
required pattern is the number of leading zeros in the resulted hash pointer. The
process to find a valid nonce is called mining.
its hash generation. Suppose an adversary with a supercomputer, then it is possible
to recreate a blockchain in an acceptable time span. The second requirement to
secure the valid blockchain is that the honest mining nodes control the majority of
computation power in the network. Since new blocks are rapidly added to the
blockchain, an adversary could not just recreate the historical blocks to tamper the
data, but also generate the hash for new blocks correspondingly. To be successful,
the adversary has to maintain computation resources stronger than the honest
nodes; otherwise, the tampered blockchain could be recognized by the miss of the
most recent blocks. Based on the assumption that the majority of computation
resource is controlled by the honest nodes, the Bitcoin-like blockchain further
requires the mining nodes to accept the longest chain as the currently valid version,
since the probability is high that an adversary could not generate blocks faster than
the honest nodes as the computation power owned by the adversary is weaker.
Interestingly, Nakamoto did not specify a strong technical method to protect
the valid hash pointers. For instance, other distributed systems split a secure key
among nodes, and no single node could access and modify critical data [8, 9, 10]. In
Bitcoin, multiple different versions are allowed, and the authentication condition is
simple—by the length of the chain. The critical factor enabling the entire approach
is the assumption of honest majority computation power. In principle, if an
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adversary has the computation resource to recreate a blockchain that is longer than
generated by the honest nodes, there is no doubt that the tampered data will
become the valid version.
Assumptions are often not reliable. The assumption under the centralized
system is that the authorized third party is trustworthy, which is not always true,
and that is why systems like blockchain will appear. Though the assumption under
blockchain can become unreliable as well, there is a fair way to make the reliability
probability high. The answer is to reward honest nodes by incentive. The honest
miners are encouraged by rewarding them with financial benefits—the coins. In the
Bitcoin protocol or other similar cryptocurrency scheme [4, 11], incentive comes in
two ways:
• the nodes who find a new block will be automatically rewarded with Bitcoins;
• the owner of the transactions will pay the mining nodes transaction fee.
Technically, these two types of incentive could not prevent misbehavior from
happening, since a successful adversary could get all the rewards. By misbehaviors
such as forking the blockchain or selfish mining, dishonest miners could rubber the
coins of honest miners by simply invalidating blocks generated by them. If the
assumption had held, such an attack would fail in that the adversary is unlikely to
generate more blocks than the honest majority. Forking the blockchain will increase
the risk of mined blocks being discarded, which means the legal revenue is decreased.
There is another layer of incentive—the reputation of the entire system and,
thus, the value of the rewards. If the adversary controls a dominant computation
power and misbehaviors happen consistently, the market confidence will be
impacted, the honest players and the public will quit, and the currency will become
worthless [12]. An essential fact to the success of Bitcoin is the interest binding

















Figure 2.4: Reputation of the system guarantees the rewards to the participants,
and thus the participants will voluntarily preserve the reputation of the system.
The increase of honest players helps maintain the portion of the computation
resource controlled by the honest players. Therefore, the probability of a successful
attack is kept low, which in turn enhances the system reputation.
order to make the rewards they get worth more, the mining nodes have to preserve
the reputation of the system in public, which forms a benign cycle, as demonstrated
by Fig. 2.4:
• the more significant reputation of the system leads to the higher value of the
coins and thus the value of the rewards;
• more rewards lead to more honest players;
• the presence of more honest players increases the computation resource
controlled by the honest parties;
• it is difficult for the dishonest player to increase their portion of computation
resource controlled
• the possibility of successful misbehavior remains low;
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• the reputation of the entire system gets enhanced.
The success of Bitcoin, and any other cryptocurrency, depends also on less
controllable factors. The system needs a bootstrap at the early stage. Early
acceptance by the public is vital for the thriving of the entire ecosystem.
It is clear that the components of the Bitcoin system are integrated tightly.
Without the incentive scheme, the blockchain is vulnerable to adversaries with
strong computation power. The security scheme of blockchain is weak from the
aspect of technology. The technical improvement from its original version is the
hash puzzle. Nevertheless, the puzzle could not make the scheme completely secure,
because it is a randomized computation. The adversary wins or loses by chance.
By this point, we have discussed the success of Bitcoin, not the success of
blockchain. We observed that it is challenging to discuss blockchain without the
background of cryptocurrencies because the attempt to decouple the blockchain
from a binding cryptocurrency usually results in fundamental modifications to the
underlying trust assumptions. The success of Bitcoin also depends on human
factors. It is true that the blockchains of successful cryptocurrencies preserve
important properties, especially the Byzantine fault tolerance in a decentralized
anonymous network without a trusted authority. However, this property is
technically quite expensive. For instance, more mining nodes generally lead to a
greater extent of decentralization of computation resources, which is good for the
security of the entire system, but also leads to more fierce competition into owning a
new block. The result is that the performance of the entire system would not scale
with the increase of computation resources. In fact, the performance is degraded in
terms of energy consumption, since the rate of block generation is somehow locked
by the protocol. More mining nodes simply increase energy consumption per block.
Hence, if we discuss blockchain without human factors, constrains become
obvious. For example, to scale the blockchain, researchers introduced permissioned
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blockchain, where the mining nodes could only join the network with permission. In
such a system, miners are more easily identified and traceable, in order to regulate
the behavior of miners, while miners could participate or quit as they wish and
anonymously. The difference is subtle comparing to a system enabled by a trusted
authority.
This observation inspires our introduction of the model of incentive-based
trust. It is important to understand the degree of trust provided by the
incentive-based approach and the scenarios in which such an approach is applicable.
In the following section, the pros and cons of blockchain as public ledger will be
discussed in detail.
2.3 Blockchain as Public Ledger
The blockchain serves as the ledger of transactions in Bitcoin. Comparing to its
predecessors [5, 6, 7], Nakamoto’s blockchain is characterized by the following
remarkable features:
• Distributed ledger—each mining node maintains its local copy of the
blockchain with the requirement that mining nodes have to update their local
copy once a version with longer chain length is found.
• Public accessibility—any user can view the transactions published on the
blockchain network.
• Immutability—transactions are confirmed and accepted by all nodes in the
network through the mining process in which the transactions are added into
blocks that are finalized by proof of work (by solving the hash puzzle); once a
transaction is confirmed in this manner, the probability of malicious
modification to the transaction is negligible, because the adversary has to
resolve the hash puzzles for the following blocks influenced by the modification.
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• Public verifiability—transactions could be verified by preceded transactions
in the blockchain.
Due to these desirable properties, blockchain is a promising technique for
public ledger providing auditability and transparency, such as decentralized
information management, immutable record-keeping for possible audit trail, and
robust and available system. Therefore, an increasing number of works aim to
decouple the blockchain from cryptocurrency as a pure database technology—the
distributed ledger technology [13]. As discussed in section 2.2, the immutability is
essentially based on the assumption that the majority of computation resource is
controlled by honest players. More precisely, a successful attacker has to control
over 50% of the mining power in order to succeed in forking the blockchain with
non-negligible probability [12]. However, this assumption also makes it difficult to
realize these desired properties without the appearance of a build-in incentive
strategy. In cryptocurrency, the primary source of reward is the coins mined during
the process of block generation. Thus despite the cheap transaction fee, miners
likely join and stay in the network, which provides a stable population base of active
miners. If the rewards purely come from transaction fees, the cost for the ledger
user would be unsustainable, considering the energy consumption of a blockchain
network with the scale comparable to that of Bitcoin. The estimated electricity used
per transaction of Bitcoin is reaching 200 kWh. Ethereum transactions seem much
cheaper than that of Bitcoin, scoring an electricity consumption of 37 kWh.
However, compared to the 0.01 kWh of Visa transaction, we can imagine 3700 times
of processing fee, if we use a blockchain-based credit card [14].
For reducing the cost of blockchain application and scalability, researchers
have introduced permissioned or private blockchain, contradictory to permissionless
or public blockchain, i.e., the Bitcoin-like blockchain. A private blockchain is able to
adopt different algorithms to scale the performance. Nodes cannot join a private
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blockchain network by simply downloading the current version of the blockchain and
broadcasting a joining announcement. Intentional nodes have to apply for
permission from the blockchain owner. Thus the permission itself serves as a kind of
a behavior limitation to the mining nodes, because to get permission the identity of
joining nodes shall be verified, which implies a non-anonymous network.
Adversaries to such a system do not enjoy a leisure equivalent to that of public
blockchain—to join freely, try attacks, and then quit freely. If attackers get caught
in a public blockchain, they can simply start using another identity.
Mining in private blockchain is organized. For example, in Hyperledger
fabric [15], transactions would be firstly ordered by the Ordering Service Nodes, and
then send to some peers designated by an endorsement policy for execution (instead
of mining nodes, nodes in Hyperledger are called peers to indicate that their
function is not mining blocks, but executing code in transactions). The result would
be endorsed by the designated peers, and other peers need only validate the
endorsement instead of re-executing the transaction. This treatment eliminates
mining competition and avoids blockchain forking. It further reduces the
computation workload by the endorsement scheme.
Despite the performance gain of a private blockchain, it indeed changes the
essential trust model of the original blockchain, which, for some advocates of
blockchain technology, is the spirit of this technology. The decentralized trust model
is suspectable in permissioned blockchain in that the owner of the blockchain is the
only entity to release the permission. The behaviors of participants are not
independent of the influence of the owner; therefore, the immutability and integrity
of data are under potential threat. The idea to eliminate the trusted authority
comes from a fundamental question: is the trusted authority actually trustworthy?
It is similar to the political problem of how to prevent the government from abusing
its unlimited power.
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This dissertation inclines to the public or permissionless blockchain mode for
the following reasons:
• Technically, the difference between private and public blockchain mainly
reflects the tradeoff between performance and security features. Suitable
decisions depend on application scenarios. There is no “one-size-fits-all”
consensus protocol (Byzantine fault tolerance), which is a well-established
understanding [16];
• Existing public blockchain still has potential with regard to scalability, when
combined with other technologies, such as off-chain channels;
• When considering off-chain extensions, public and private blockchain are
logically equivalent because they provide the same interfaces for off-chain
applications.
The choice between private and public blockchain is mainly about the
conflict between performance and immutability of data. We can choose private
blockchain for better performance, vice versa, depending on the nature of
application scenarios. Now we consider the feature of public verifiability, which is
another primary reason for the adoption of blockchain as a public ledger.
2.3.1 Questionable Public Verifiability of Blockchain
Public verifiability and immutability of data of blockchain attract researchers
looking for transparent and immutable record keeping for possible audit trail [17].
However, approaches often leverage the public accessibility instead of the
verifiability feature. For instance, consider a blockchain-based financial statement
publishment system, where companies anonymously publish their statements on a
blockchain for audit. A questionable logic in such a system is that if a company
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Algorithm 1: Ledger Object L




5 S ← S‖r /* ‖ is the concatenation operator */
6 return
tries to cheat, such misbehavior is detectable because of the public verifiability of
the blockchain, and therefore the auditing result is provably correct. If there is no
anonymous requirement, public accessibility may provide some degree of verifiability
since it is relatively easy to build a connection between the financial statement and
the company and its operational activities. Nevertheless, with anonymity, as long as
the number of income and outcome matches, there is no way to identify a cheater by
the use of blockchain. To understand this problem, we should examine the public
verifiability of blockchain in detail.
Let us start with a formal definition of a ledger object for the convenience of
further discussion. We borrow the form from Antonio F. Anta and Maurice
Herlihy [18, 19].
Definition 1. A ledger L is a sequence of records over a sequential history H
defined as follows. The initial value of the sequence L.S is the empty sequence ∅.
Suppose the value of the sequence in ledger L is L.S = V at the invocation of an
operation π, then:
1. if π is an L.getp() operation, then the response of π returns V , and
2. if π is an L.appendp(r) operation, then set the value of sequence in ledger L to
L.S = V ‖r.
Operations get() and append() are defined in Algorithm 1.
This definition describes a ledger as an append-only list of records and does
not capture the distributed nature of blockchain, but it is enough for the discussion
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of the public verifiability of blockchain in this section. We extend it to a distributed
version at the end of this chapter. Note, though the operation get() only returns the
entire list S, other types of reading operation could easily be implemented on top of
get(). This treatment is for the simplicity of the definition and reflects the essence.
In the work of Maurice Herlihy [19], a ledger with public verifiability is
realized by adding a Boolean function Valid(). Precisely, Valid() is invoked by the
operation append() with an input of a sequence of records S and returns true if and
only if some semantics are preserved. Upon the return value of Valid(), append()
fails or accepts the operation request. The formal definition of the validated ledger
is extended from Definition 1, taking into account the influence of Valid() to the
execution route:
Definition 2. A validated ledger VL is a sequence of records over a sequential
history H defined as follows. The initial value of the sequence VL.S is the empty
sequence ∅. Suppose the value of the sequence in ledger VL is VL.S = V at the
invocation of an operation π, then:
1. if π is a VL.getp() operation, then the response of π returns V ,
2. if π is a VL.appendp(r) operation and Valid(V ‖r) = true, then set the value
of sequence in ledger L to L.S = V ‖r and respond with ACK, and
3. if π is a VL.appendp(r) operation and Valid(V ‖r) = false, then keep the
value of sequence in ledger L to L.S = V and respond with NACK.
Operations get(), append(), and Valid() are defined as in Algorithm 2.
The semantics need to be preserved for Bitcoin-like blockchain by Valid() in
Maurice Herlihy’s work [19] and described as preventing double-spending. However,
this is not a precise abstraction of the verification mechanism of Bitcoin-like
blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, few works are aiming to understand and
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Algorithm 2: Validated Ledger Object VL




5 if Valid(S‖r) then
6 S ← S‖r
/* ‖ is the concatenation operator */
7 return ACK
8 else return NACK
Bob: 8 BTC
New Transaction:
Bob send Alice 3 BTC
Bob: 8 -> 5




Figure 2.5: The transaction verification of Bitcoin-like blockchain relies on previous
transactions. In this case, Bob intends to transfer 3 BTC to Alice. The mining
nodes check if the account of Bob has enough balance to complete this trade by
tracing back along the blockchain to find transactions that transfer more than 3
BTC to Bob and those Bitcoins have not yet been spent.
model the verification mechanism of blockchain, and thus lead to drawbacks of
applications relying on the verification feature.
Fig. 2.5 displays how the verification mechanism works. Suppose Bob
transfers Alice 3 units of Bitcoin,
1. a new transaction is broadcasted to the network announcing that Bob
transfers Alice 3 units of Bitcoin;
2. the mining nodes check the blockchain to find if any transactions are
indicating Bob has enough units to complete this transfer;
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3. if Bob has enough Bitcoin in his account, the mining nodes include this new
transaction in a block; and
4. when the block containing the new transaction is successfully mined, the
transfer is completed.
What makes the verification process subtle is the structure of the account
information. Bitcoin accounts do not have integrated data in the blockchain to
describe their status, though there are Bitcoin wallet applications that collect and
summarise necessary data to represent an account. Instead, only the transactions
are listed in the blockchain. In order to check if an account has enough balance to
finish a transaction, mining nodes traverse the blockchain to find one or more
transactions whose combined balance is greater than the required value, and that
have not been spent yet. A new transaction must refer to the transactions whose
balance is spent in this new transaction, which means a transaction with a
balance is an incoming transaction and has no further transactions refer
to it.
Fig. 2.6 illustrates a case possible for the example in Fig. 2.5. The first
incoming transaction is of balance 2 BTC and referred by two spending transactions
that spend 1 BTC each. Thus when the Bob-to-Alice transaction is announced, the
mining nodes would not include it into a candidate transaction for this transfer.
When miners find the transaction with a balance of 7 BTC, they stop traversing the
blockchain and pick this transaction as the one spent by the new transaction. In the
new transaction, 3 BTC are transferred to Alice, and the rest 4 BTC are included in
a self-transfer to Bob, and the transaction with a balance of 7 BTC is referred.
Clearly, there is a linked list of transactions related to every unit of Bitcoin,
from the latest incoming transaction back to its origin. An important feature of
Bitcoin is that the only source of Bitcoin is the mining activity. Whenever a block is
mined, the miner who solves the puzzle could include a transaction that indicates a
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Historical Transactions of Bob's Account
to Bob: 2 BTC from Bob: 1 BTC
from Bob: 1 BTC
to Bob: 1 BTC
to Bob: 7 BTC
from Bob to Alice: 3 BTC
from Bob to Bob: 4 BTC
New transaction
Figure 2.6: A possible situation of transactions corresponding to the example in
Fig. 2.5. The first to-Bob transaction is a spent transaction which could be used for
completing this trade. The second to-Bob transaction is a not-spent transaction,
but indicates a balance not enough to complete the transfer. The third is a
not-spent transaction and has enough balance, thus the new transactions refer to it
transferring 3 BTC to Alice and the rest back to Bob.
certain amount of Bitcoin is transferred to the miner’s account. Unlike the
traditional banking system, there is no deposit transaction that injects balance from
another source. This feature is important because, in essence, the “space” of Bitcoin
is closed. Formally, we model the Bitcoin transaction system by the Self-Verifiable
transaction system:
Definition 3. A self-verifiable transaction system VT consists of three
components:
1. an element base EB which is initialized as an empty set ∅—an element is
noted as a tuple {ei, value}
2. a label set ID which is defined over the space of strings with a fixed length,
3. a transaction forest T F whose trees are rooted in the element base EB—the
nodes in layers below the roots satisfy the requirement as follows,
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• every node t contains a tuple {id, value, parent}, where id ∈ ID,
• if a node t has child nodes, its value t.value equals the sum of the values
of its child nodes, t.value =
∑
i∈child ti.value.
Allowed operations in the system are defined as follows:
• Element generation, gen(id)—add a new element e into the element base
EB, and create a new tree with one child node rooted with the newly generated
element in the forest T F ,
• Validation, valid(T F)—take the transaction forest and the element base as
the input, and return true if and only if the sum of the values at the root layer
equals the sum of the values of all the leaves,
• Transfer, transfer(idfrom, idto, value)—take as input the ID of the sender
idfrom, the ID of the receiver idto, and the value, find a set of leaves with
t.id = idfrom satisfying
∑
i∈found ti.value ≥ value, add child nodes with
t.id = idto satisfying
∑
i∈added ti.value = value, and add a child node with
t.id = idfrom satisfying t.value =
∑
i∈found ti.value− value; invoke valid()
with the transaction forest T Fupdated with newly added nodes; if
valid(T Fupdated) = true, accept the transfer. Otherwise, rollback the
transaction forest.
Operation gen(), transfer(), and valid() are defined as in Algorithm 3.
Per the model definition of the self-verifiable transaction system, we can
provide a proof of the verifiability feature of Bitcoin-like blockchain to prevent
double-spending attacks.
Theorem 1. Let VT be a self-verifiable transaction system, as defined in
Definition 3. Then there is no double-spending transactions iff VT .valid() returns
true.
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Algorithm 3: Self-verifiable transaction system VT
1 Init: EB ← ∅, ID ← {0, 1}n, T F ← ∅
2 function VT .gen(id)
3 e = new element
4 EB ← EB ∪ e
5 new node t← {id, e.value, e}
6 T F ← T F ∪ t
7 function VT .valid(T F)
8 if sum(ti∈roots.value) = sum(tj∈leaves.value) then
9 return true
10 else return false
11 function VT .transfer(idfrom, idto, value)
12 find a set of leaves C:
13 sum(ti∈C .value) ≥ value
14 ti∈C .id == idfrom
15 create new set of nodes NC:
16 sum(ti∈NC .value) = value
17 ti∈NC .id = idto
18 ti∈NC .parent = idfrom
19 create new node t:
20 t.value = sum(ti∈NC .value)− value
21 t.id = idfrom
22 t.parent = idfrom
23 T F ← T F ∪NC ∪ t





Proof. By Definition 3, the fact that VT .valid() returns true indicates that the
sum of the values at the root layer equals the sum of the values of all the leaves in
the transaction forest T F . Another fact is that if a node t has child nodes, its value
t.value equals the sum of the values of its child nodes, t.value =
∑
i∈child ti.value.
Thus, we can divide each tree by the method below,
• for a node with only one child node, keep it the same,
• for a node t with multiple child nodes, create a dummy set of nodes in which
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each dummy node corresponds to a child node and satisfies
tdi .value = tci .value∑
di
tdi .value = t.value
tdi .id = t.id
tdi .parent = t.parent
• abort if any of the conditions could not be satisfied.
Repeat this treatment from the leaves up to the roots, and then we get a dummy
forest in which each tree is a linked list with every node that has the same value. In
essence, we have established a 1-on-1 map between every not-spent transaction to
its element base. Obviously, if this 1-on-1 map is established successfully, it is
equivalent to the fact that the sum of the values at the root layer equals the sum of
the values of all the leaves in the transaction forest T F . This 1-on-1 map indicates
no element is spent twice as well. Therefore, the problem is reduced to there is no
double-spending transaction iff the 1-on-1 map could be created. We have shown
⇒, we now prove ⇐. Suppose there is a pair of double-spending transactions. Then
there must be at least one node tds whose value is less than the sum of the values of
its child nodes, tds.value <
∑
i∈child ti.value. Thus, the dividing operation is
aborted, and the map could not be created.
We defined the operation valid() as comparing the sum of leaves and the
sum of roots for the conciseness of discussion. From the basic definition, a
formulation for quicker verification could be induced.
Theorem 2. For a new transaction t of transfer(idfrom, idto, value) in a
self-verifiable transaction system VT , the operation valid(t, tparent, tsibling) is
equivalent to the operation valid(T F) in Definition 3, which is defined as below,
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• return true, if the sum of the values of t and tsibling equals the value of tparent,
• return false otherwise.
Proof. For simplicity, we only discuss the case with only one node involved. Proving
the case with multiple nodes follows by separating them into several single node
cases. From the structure of the forest, a transfer transaction might add at most
two children to a node, with the constrain that the sum of the new child nodes
equals their parent’s value. Therefore, this operation would not change the sum of
the leaves layer, and the equivalence holds.
This model of self-verifiable transaction system helps understand the
verifiability of Bitcoin-like blockchain. The insights we achieved from the study is
that the verifiability of Bitcoin-like blockchain is actually provided by the
self-verifiable transaction system. This transaction system is established on top of a
distributed ledger object, and the feature provided by the distributed ledger object
is the public accessibility.
It seems that this combination could provide public verifiability; however, we
show the limitation of the self-verifiability transaction system, and when combining
with Bitcoin-like blockchain, its verifiability is undermined.
From the proof of Theorem 1, the verification of a transaction is, in essence,
to find the origin of the information contained in the transaction from the element
base EB. In other words, if the information does not have its origin in the element
base EB, then it could not be verified by the operation valid(). A double-spending
transaction could not be validated because it indeed introduces information whose
origin is out of the element base EB. Apparently, the reliability of the
self-verifiability transaction system relies on the generation of elements because the
verifiability of the system could not guarantee the operation gen() is
valid. An implicit feature in the self-verifiability transaction system is that the
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generation of elements is always valid by default. In Bitcoin-like blockchain, the
validity of generation is justified by proof of work, which is out of the transaction
system itself.
Consider leveraging the Bitcoin-like blockchain (which is a combination of a
ledger object and a self-verifiable transaction system) for general-purpose record
keeping. We must firstly extend Definition 3 to support data that is different from
cryptocurrency. We provide an extended definition after the necessary discussion.
As mentioned previously, Bitcoin-like blockchain justifies the generation of its
cryptocurrency by proof of work during the mining process. This method is a
natural choice because the transaction system is exclusively designed for
cryptocurrency, and the system pays the miners for their work with newly generated
currency. However, proof of work could not justify arbitrary data. For instance, a
service provider violates a privacy policy, but announces to the blockchain that it
complies with the policy. This announcement, in this case, is incorrect information,
probably misleading, even malicious. A blockchain with self-verifiability transaction
system has two possible treatments when dealing with this information:
• treat the information as a transaction, then valid() returns false and reject
the information, or
• treat the information as operation gen(), then add it into the element base
without verification.
Assume the system supports such information by assigning a recognizable
value. Then, the first treatment always rejects such information regardless its
correctness since there is no element in the element base EB corresponding to the
information. By definition, a transaction could be accepted only if a related element
has been generated prior to the transaction; otherwise, valid() always returns
false. On the other hand, the second treatment accepts the information without
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justification because proof-of-work is unable to make a judgment on the correctness
of specific information. Obviously, the first treatment is not applicable for general
purpose data storage, because it prevents any data from being kept into a
blockchain system. The second treatment is the only way to include arbitrary data
into Bitcoin-like blockchain, but the reliability of data could not be ensured. Back
to the example, the ledger includes the incorrect report regarding the policy
enforcement performance of the service provider. The public might make misled
decisions, if people trust this ledger as a reliable data source.
We extend the self-verifiable transaction system by a hybrid-verifiability
transaction system, as defined below.
Definition 4. A hybrid-verifiability transaction system HV consists of four
components:
1. an internal element base IE which is initialized as an empty set ∅—an
element is noted as a tuple {ei, value},
2. a label set ID which is defined over the space of strings with arbitrary length
{0, 1}∗,
3. an external element base XE which is initialized as an empty set ∅—an
element is noted as a tuple {id, string|id ∈ ID},
4. a transaction forest T F whose trees are rooted in the internal element base
IE—the nodes in layers below the roots satisfy the requirements that follow,
• every node t contains a tuple {id, value, string, parent}, where id ∈ ID,
• if a node t has child nodes, its value t.value equals the sum of the values
of its child nodes, t.value =
∑
i∈child ti.value.
Allowed operations in the system are defined as follows,
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• internal element generation, INgen(value)—add a new element ie into
the internal element base IE, and create a new tree with one child node rooted
with the newly generated element in the forest T F ,
• external element generation, EXgen(id, string)—add a new element xe
into the external element base XE,
• validation, valid(T F)—take the transaction forest and the element base as
the input, and return true if and only if the sum of the value field at the root
layer equals the sum of the value field all the leaves (the string field is not
taken into account),
• transfer, transfer(idfrom, idto, value, string)—take as input the ID of the
sender idfrom, the ID of the receiver idto, and the value, find a set of leaves
with t.id = idfrom satisfying
∑
i∈found ti.value ≥ value, add child nodes with
t.id = idto satisfying
∑
i∈added ti.value = value, add a child node with
t.id = idfrom satisfying t.value =
∑
i∈found ti.value− value, and invoke
EXgen(idto,string); invoke valid() with the transaction forest T Fupdated with
new added nodes; if valid(T Fupdated) = true, accept the transfer, otherwise
rollback the transaction forest.
Operation INgen(), EXgen(), transfer(), and valid() are defined as in
Algorithm 4, 5.
This definition provides the functionality for general-purpose data storage. It
captures the fact that the blockchain system is not reliable when serving as a
general-purpose ledger, because it lacks the capability of verifying external
information. The essential difference between the operations INgen() and EXgen() is
that the INgen() is a trusted method, i.e., the information generated by INgen() is
believed to be the truth, while EXgen() only generates an element for injected
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Algorithm 4: Hybrid-verifiability transaction system HV
1 Init: IE ← ∅, XE ← ∅, ID ← {0, 1}n, T F ← ∅
2 function HV .INgen(value)
3 e = new element
4 e.value = value
5 IE ← IE ∪ e
6 new node t← {id, e.value,∅, e}
7 T F ← T F ∪ t
8 function HV .EXgen(id, string)
9 e = new element
10 e.value = value
11 e.id = id
12 XE ← XE ∪ e
13 function HV .valid(T F)
14 if sum(ti∈roots.value) = sum(tj∈leaves.value) then
15 return true
16 else return false
external information, but does not guarantee its authenticity. This model is a
reasonable abstraction of the Bitcoin-like blockchain. The block mining process
functions as the INgen() in which the coins are generated as elements, and the
proof-of-work justifies the generation of coins as truth. The Bitcoin transactions are
monetary only, and the verification process only determines whether an address
owns enough coins to complete a transfer. There are no transactions that transfer
coins which are not derived from mining. The “coin”, or its equivalent, is the only
verifiable object in the ledger.
Though the Bitcoin-like blockchain allows users to upload some data by
attaching a string of bit in transactions, it accepts this data field without any
verification. In our definition, the operation EXgen() corresponds to this feature.
Defining the inclusion of external data as a type of generation of elements is a
natural choice, as mentioned previously. There is an additional benefit of this
decision: we could retain the definition of allowed operations as an option for users,
and a self-verifiable transaction system could be defined on top of XE without too
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Algorithm 5: Hybrid-verifiability transaction system HV
1 function VT .transfer(idfrom, idto, value)
2 find a set of leaves C:
3 sum(ti∈C .value) ≥ value
4 ti∈C .id == idfrom
5 create new set of nodes NC:
6 sum(ti∈NC .value) = value
7 ti∈NC .id = idto
8 ti∈NC .parent = idfrom
9 create new node t:
10 t.value = sum(ti∈NC .value)− value
11 t.id = idfrom
12 t.parent = idfrom
13 T F ← T F ∪NC ∪ t
14 HV .EXgen(id, string)





much effort. Ethereum [11] allows its blockchain network to execute arbitrary user
scripts as a smart contract with a fee, which enhanced the ability of verification.
However, the validity of external information still depends on the reliability of the
information source. In a smart contract implementation, Hawk [20], an additional
private layer is introduced to verify the external proof of contract compliance, where
its blockchain only takes currency transfer as transactions. This mechanism could
be effectively modeled as a distributed ledger combined with a special extension of
the hybrid-verifiability transaction system.
To conclude this section, the data from the world outside blockchain (which
is modeled as the combination of distributed ledger and hybrid-verifiability
transaction system) is not reliable due to a lack of applicable verification
mechanism. More precisely, the reliability of data in blockchain depends on the
reliability of the data source. Data in the blockchain is differentiated by the
properties of the related generation process INgen() and EXgen() in which INgen()
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represents reliable data source guaranteed by the mining process, and EXgen()
represents unreliable source respectively. Therefore, to leverage blockchain as a
reliable public ledger, we should add another layer of verification to the EXgen() in
order to create a reliable data source. We discuss how to establish an additional
verification mechanism in chapter 3.
2.3.2 Distributed Ledger Object
In the preceding section, we discussed the ledger and its verifiability on the base of
the centralized model. One reason for this treatment is that it simplifies the
discussion of verifiability without impacting the generality, because the verifiability
of the transaction system does not depend on the ledger object, as demonstrated by
the analysis. As a consequence, it is unnecessary to consider the verification when
defining the distributed ledger object. A more important observation is that even
the consensus does not influence the verifiability of the transaction system; thus, we
did not introduce the operation valid() as part of the distributed ledger object as
Antonio F. Anta, etc. did in their work [19].
Another technical decision is that our definition of distributed ledger is not
based on generic deterministic atomic broadcast service [21] since it does not
capture the nature of the consensus protocol of blockchain. The models with atomic
broadcast, in essence, replace the Byzantine fault tolerance consensus protocol with
consensus in the crash-prone system like the one considered in [22].
We describe the distributed ledger object in Algorithms 6, 7, and 8. In the
pseudo-code, the mining nodes are modeled as servers in which each node maintains
a local copy of the entire blockchain. The consensus algorithm only depends on the
length of the blockchain, i.e., the longest version must be accepted unconditionally.
Thus, an interesting observation is that although the verifiability of the transaction
system prevents the double-spending attack, this attack is still possible in the entire
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Algorithm 6: Client code of a distributed ledger DL executed by process p
1 seq ← 0
2 select L ⊆ S : |L| ≥ f + 1
3 function DL.get()
4 seq ← seq + 1
5 send request(seq, p,GET ) to the servers in L
6 wait response(seq, p,GET, V ) from some i ∈ L
7 return V
8 function DL.append(r)
9 seq ← seq + 1
10 send request(seq, p, APPEND, r) to the servers in L
11 wait response(seq, p, APPEND, res) from some i ∈ L
12 return res
Algorithm 7: Consensus algorithm of a distributed ledger DL
1 function DL.propose(v)
2 if r /∈ Si.DL.V then
3 DL.append(v)
4 Vi ← DL.get()
5 if receive(CONSENSUS, Vj) then
6 Vreceived ← Vj
7 if Vreceived ≥ Vi then
8 DL.V = Vreceived
9 else DL.V = Vi
10 broadcast(DL.V )
blockchain system setting with a probability depending on the distribution of
computational power. The double-spending attack is realized by a rollback attack in
essence.
Another problem related to the verification of the transactions is the
append-only feature. This feature is related to immutability, which is a desirable
property for a ledger in that the finalized records are supposed to be reliable as long
as the data source is reliable. However, it could be problematic regarding the
flexibility of general-purpose data storage. For instance, a relational database
requires a more flexible data structure. The append-only feature limits the range of
application scenarios of blockchain. The immutability of blockchain sometimes
[38]
Algorithm 8: Server code of a distributed ledger DL executed by server i ∈ S
1 init: Si ← ∅
2 receive(seq, p,GET )
3 send response(seq, p,GET, Si) to process p
4 receive (seq, p, APPEND, r)
5 DL.propose(r)
6 send response(seq, p, APPEND,ACK) to process p
causes a problem: any operation other than get() increases its size (e.g., attributes
like address could be modified directly, but it must add a new entry to represent an
address change). A possible way of reasonable data modification is to announce a
replacement of the incorrect information. This method is flawed in two aspects: 1)
it wastes the expensive storage resource in the BC system (i.g both the previous
information and its modification are permanently kept in the BC and duplicated
among the mining nodes); 2) It is not efficient to retrieve the current status of a
specific attribute.
In addition, general purpose recording requires a system with scalability,
because of the volume of data entries and frequent incremental and inquiry
operations. When putting all the records into blocks, it generates highly frequent
transactions which could dysfunction a public blockchain network. As a matter of
fact, it takes 10 minutes on average for a Bitcoin block to be mined. For a Bitcoin
transaction to be confirmed, it is expected to take an hour, and the overall
throughput of the network is limited to around 7 transactions per second [23].
Existing solutions for scaling blockchains consider structures with off-chain
databases and on-chain hashes, in which the reliability of the off-chain database
remains questionable.
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2.4 Other Related Work
Kaiwen Zhang et al. structured the requirements for dependable, scalable, and
pervasive distributed ledgers with blockchains, and identifies research challenges to
achieve this objective [24]. One of the particular difficulties besides the scalability
problem is transaction privacy. Because of the transparency of the ledger, it is
possible to construct an activity graph for a particular address. zkLedger [17]
attempted to solve this problem for a public auditable ledger by hiding plain
information via Pedersen commitment and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Z.
Shae and J. Tsai proposed an approach to transform blockchain into distributed
parallel computing architecture for precision medicine [25]. Though different from
the purpose of our scheme, it shares the same extension, i.e., to coordinate on-chain
and off-chain computation. The challenge of the problem is how to keep the
on-chain workload lightweight. Their work depends on an off-chain control node
that could help the on-chain program call off-chain arbitrary code to execute the
main computation. It works when the entire computation is owned by a single
organization. In the presence of collaborators, the output from other participants
could be questionable, and thus a verification process is necessary. There are
discussions about the incentive mechanism underlying the blockchain-based
cryptocurrencies [26, 27]. However, their analysis focuses on the explanation of how
the existing schemes work rather than provide a quantified method to dedicatedly
design incentive frameworks for different application scenarios.
[40]
Chapter 3
VOCMC for Verification and Scalability
3.1 Off-chain Payment Channel and State Channel
Public blockchains insist on the permissionless property of their consensus
protocols. As a consequence, the scalability of a public blockchain is limited to a
magnitude (about 10 transactions per second) that is not comparable to the
transaction system of the traditional centralized ledger (thousands of transactions
per second) [28, 29]. One category of scaling solutions [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] is
alternative consensus protocols, which fall short of lacking backward compatibility
or fundamentally altering the decentralized security assumption. Off-chain payment
channels (that are referred to as layer-two protocols in [36]) aim to improve the
scalability of Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies for fast and frequent payment
processing [37, 38] by reducing the transaction load on the underlying blockchain.
According to off-chain payment channel protocols, two parties deposit coins
into a shared multi-signature address to open an off-chain payment channel. After
opening, the two parties can make payments to each other by agreement on the
distribution of the deposit coins without generating any on-chain transaction. The
agreement is in the form of a committed transaction. For example, if Alice wants to
initiate a payment to Bob via an off-chain payment channel, she signs a transaction
indicating the resulted balance. This transaction is a commitment transaction that
is not broadcasted to the network immediately. The new payment replaces the
preceded commitment transaction. At closure, the blockchain network takes the
latest commitment transaction and redistributes the deposit coins.
Unless one party could successfully forge the signature of its counterpart, a
dishonest party is only able to cheat by posting an expired commitment transaction
to close the payment channel. Therefore, any transaction for channel closure should
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be finalized after a timeout enough for the counterpart to react to the dispute. A
proven cheater will be punished economically in some way defined by the contract.
A disadvantage of this original form of payment channels is that the payment
channel is pairwise. Only the participants of the transaction that setup the payment
channel could pay each other through it. Thus, the mainstream of research on this
area is to connect existing payment channels into an off-chain payment network. If
Alice wants to pay Bob, they do not have to set up a payment channel between
them, as long as there is a user (we may call her Chris) having a payment channel
with both Alice and Bob. Alice pays Chris, then Chris pays Bob. Any number of
nodes can be added to the chained payment; thus, any pair of users in this network
could pay each other with established additional channels.
Another direction of payment channel research is to generalize it into a
so-called state channel [39]. The participants of a state channel monitor and operate
with some states in concern. In payment channels (a specific state channel), the
interesting state is the deposit paid by the participants. The generalized state
channel could accept any variables as the states. This scheme has the potential to
broaden the adoption of blockchain applications in areas other than
cryptocurrencies, but the potential has not been deeply explored by the researchers.
Raiden is the most prominent project that implements state channel, but currently,
it focuses on the implementation of payment channels via this generalized
framework.
Besides the scalability improvement, the off-chain payment channel, or state
channel, in fact, guarantees the reliability of external information by probable
economic loss resulted from being caught behaving dishonestly. Therefore, we can
build a protocol based on this observation. In the next section, we will discuss an
underlying trust concept, and we call it incentive-based trust, then propose an
information verification framework on top of it.
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3.2 Incentive-based Trust
There are two folds of security concerns related to off-chain payment channels. The
first is that the deposit balance should be correct; the second is that the publishing
of the transaction indicating correct, current balance state should be guaranteed.
State-of-art research has focused on the publishing problem, i.e., how to guarantee
the honest participants could publish the valid commitment transactions by the
normal closure or by the dispute process when the counterparts attempt to publish
an outdated transaction to rollback the state of the balance. On the other hand, the
correctness of the state has not attracted enough attention because the correctness
of the states seems a natural property in such an environment. However, correctness
is not guaranteed in general. Suppose Alice pays Bob 10 USD for a sandwich, which
is described in the transactions, as shown in Fig. 3.1. Although the value of the
payment is correct, the additional information provided by the comment could be
correct, ambiguous, or absolutely ignored. This scenario is a common case when we
examine any type of transaction description. Other examples can be easily found
from the online banking applications. We can identify two types of information from
the example in Fig. 3.1: I. the payment value whose correctness could directly
impact the interest of the participants, II. comment whose correctness may be
irrelevant to the benefit of each participant in this case. We call type I as
incentive-associated information, if we generalize the financial interest. For off-chain
payment channel, the protocol naturally ensures the correctness of the balance state,
because the deposit balance is an incentive-associated information. The participants
will automatically take care of the balance when reaching an agreement.
Similar to the cryptocurrencies, an important factor for the overall security of
the off-chain payment channel is the incentive, which may be more influential than






























Figure 3.1: A: a transaction with comment describing the behavior related to this
payment; B: the comment with partial information; C: comment is ignored.
none of the participants controls a dominant majority of the mining resource, in
practice, the formation of mining pools indeed have put threats to this fundamental
security assumption. Mining pools are groups of cooperating miners who agree to
share block rewards in proportion to their contributed mining hash power [40]. By
joining a mining pool, the miners are able to reduce the variance of their mining
rewards. At the time of writing, the top 3 leading mining pools hold over 51% share
of the computing resource; the biggest pool, BTC.com controls 29.6%; and notably,
most of the mining pools are concentrated in China where is estimated 81% of the
network hash rate [40]. With the presence of mining pools, Eyal and Sirer proposed
the selfish mining strategy that allows a pool with 1/3 of the overall hash power to
obtain more revenue than its ratio of the total hash power [41].
Nevertheless, such an attack has not been observed. The pools have been
benign and followed the protocol so far [41]. The assumption is that the majority
miners may avoid strategies that earn more bitcoins but decrease the expected value
of their future mining rewards since a substantial share requires a large amount of
investment to maintain [12]. Different from the measurement of traditional security
solutions, currently the security or trust strength supported by incentive has not
been measured by quantified models, thus how to effectively choose the
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reward-penalty combination remains an open question. Despite the lack of precise
models, we believe the successful applications demonstrate the feasibility of the
frameworks based on this type of security.
In cryptocurrency, the incentive is more rewards than penalties in that the
reputation of the system supports the value of the coins. For the off-chain payment
channel, the penalty has the main influence. Imagine Bob pays to Alice but files a
transaction with less value than expected. Alice double-checks the transaction, then
closes the channel once she finds out about the fraud. Bob may lose part of his
deposit according to the contract. There is another factor that contributes to the
correctness of the states: the direct interest conflict between Alice and Bob. If the
state is incorrect, either the interest of Alice or Bob would be damaged. Therefore,
to protect their benefit from pillage, Alice and Bob have a strong motivation to
carefully monitor the state.
To summarize, we identify three properties that could support effective
verification of external information (states), and ensure the reliability of the
information published on the blockchain, the public ledger:
• there is an incentive that could effectively encourage honest behaviors;
• the value of the states could alter the distribution of interest, which could lead
to direct conflict between the participants; and
• if the incentive strategy is a zero-sum game, the information should be
neutral, i.e., an approximation of the truth with negligible error.
For our work, an inspiring observation is that users and service providers
may hold opposite interests on policy compliance, if the states of policy compliance
are related to the payment process. In consequence, the incentive-based trust can be
applied. Note that, for other application scenarios, the chance is high that we can
set up an environment where the external information can be related to some
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incentives and situations with interest conflict, but it is not clear if such an
environment always exists. Solving this problem needs a refined model describing its
underlying mechanism, which is out of the scope of this dissertation.
3.3 Defining VOCMC
We discuss the two-party variant of VOCMC in this section, where we assume the
two parties are users of a blockchain system in which a type of cryptocurrency is
defined, and each party holds enough balance of the cryptocurrency in some private
address. Upon the establishment, these parties have to transfer some units of the
cryptocurrency form their private addresses into a 2-of-2 multi-signature address as
the deposits, i.e., any transfer from the 2-of-2 address requires 2 signatures to
authorize. This framework could be simply extended to n-party cases by applying an
n-of-n multi-signature address and adjusting protocol synchronization, respectively.
We follow the sketch used in [42] to describe the VOCMC protocol. The
protocol essentially relies on the composition of protocols, and thus we breakdown
the entire protocol into some component protocols universally composable [43], i.e.,
a synchronous version of the UC framework [44]. More precisely, the parties who
run the protocol are modeled as interactive poly-time Turing machines (ITM) [45]
whose inputs are from the environment E , which is modeled as an ITM as well. The
environment E represents anything “external” to the execution of the current
protocol instance, e.g., the inputs from the users, other running instances of
protocols, etc. Further, we define ideal functionalities for the on-chain executed
modules and define the entire protocol as running in a hybrid model with the ideal
functionalities. We will discuss the security implications of this hybrid model in
section 3.4.
In the rest of this section, we will first discuss the ideal functionalities
handling cryptocurrency; second, discuss the VOCMC by dividing it into
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Algorithm 9: Ledger Functionality FL
1 Data: a balance vector(x1, ..., xn)∈ Rn+
2 Input: message from environment E
3 Upon receive message(add, sid, {(pij , yij)tj=1|t ∈ Zn+, yij ∈ R+}):
4 begin
5 forall j ∈ {1, ..., t} do
6 xij := xij + jij
7 end
8 end
9 Upon receive message(remove, sid, {(pij , yij)tj=1|t ∈ Zn+, yij ∈ R+}):
10 begin
11 if (xij ≤ yij∀j ∈ 1, ..., t) then
12 reply message(NOFUNDS, cid)
13 stop
14 else
15 forall j ∈ {1, ..., t} do




subroutines including channel creation, contract registration, off-chain update, and
channel closure. Each discussion contains its on-chain ideal functionality and
off-chain local components.
3.3.1 Ledger Functionality and Incentive Function
This functionality handling cryptocurrency is separated from other on-chain
functionalities because it is a build-in mechanism offered by the public blockchain
system, and thus not a component of the VOCMC but a critical dependence.
Following [46], we model the cryptocurrency mechanism as a special
functionality FL by which the balance owned by each party is tracked, and currency
transfer is made via operations remove and add (see Algorithm 9). The “transfer”
operation is represented by two separate operations remove and add to simplify the
expression, though the underlying execution logic of blockchain is, in effect,
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Algorithm 10: Incentive function Inc(ev1, ..., evn)
1 Data: a vector of party identifiers(p1, ..., pn), a vector of initial
balances(b1, ..., bn), a balance pool bp, pool identifier(p0)
2 Input: a vector of evidences (ev1, ..., evn)
3 begin
4 create a reward vector(r1, ..., rn|
∑n
i ri == bp) according to (ev1, ..., evn)
5 forall j ∈ {1, ..., n} do
6 send message(remove, sid, p0, rj) to ledger functionality FL




Note, the balance vector (x1, ..., xn) includes n elements, where n is the
number of existing parties (p1, ..., pn). The state of the functionality FL is always
public, i.e., the environment E , the parties (p1, ..., pn), and any potential adversary
A have free access to its contents. The vectors (x1, ..., xn) and (p1, ..., pn) are
abstractions of account and balance in the blockchain concept since they are not
maintained explicitly in the blockchain ledger. A party pi corresponds to a set of m
addresses (addi1, ..., add
i
m) where m could be any positive integer. The balance xi for
a party pi is collectively represented by all the transactions on the ledger, related to
the party pi. The underlying detail is omitted in the rest of the discussion. The
balance vector (x1, ..., xn) and the party vector (p1, ..., pn) possess capable expressive
power for the description of this protocol.
The incentive function Inc(ev1, ..., evn) is part of the VOCMC protocol (see
Algorithm 10). Since it encapsulates the calling of the ledger functionality FL and is
the only interface for the protocol accessing the ledger functionality FL after
channel creation, we describe it together with FL.
It holds an initial balance vector (b1, ..., bn) which is different from the
balance vector (x1, ..., xn), i.e., the deposit the parties put into the VOCMC channel
space, which is frozen by the channel from the ledger balance (x1, ..., xn). The frozen
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balance will finally be redistributed according to some reward or penalty policy. An
evidence vector (ev1, ..., evn) is needed to call this function, for the reward policy to
generate the reward vector (r1, ..., rn). Since Inc() could only redistribute the frozen




i bi = bp, where
bp indicates the total value of the frozen balance. After the decision of the reward
vector, the balance will be transferred to the parties’ accounts respectively from the
frozen account (denoted as p0 in Algorithm 10).
3.3.2 Channel Creation
In order to create a new VOCMC channel, the environment E has to send messageE
(CREATE, cid, pida, pidb) to the instance of local protocol Π(L) (see Algorithm 11)
run by party ppida to initiate the creation process. cid indicates the global identifier
of the channel to be created, and pidb indicates the other party that the channel will
be created in between. The protocol instance of the initiating party ppida sends to
the on-chain ideal functionality Fch the message (CONSTRUCT) in which CODE INC
contains the incentive function code, the reward policy, and the required initial
value for the balance vector, to request construction of the VOCMC contract. The
ideal functionality (see Algorithm 12) freezes the required initial balance in the
account identified by cid on the ledger and send messageF(INITIALIZING) to the
other party identified by ppidb .
Upon receiving the messageF(INITIALIZING) and messageE (CREATECONF,
cid, pida, pidb), the party ppidb responds with the message(CONFIRM) to confirm the
initialization. Then the ideal functionality Fch freezes the required initial balance
for party ppidb and sends messageF to both parties. Otherwise, there is a timeout
triggered in the protocol instance of party ppida who thereafter has the option to
refund the initial balance frozen during the initiating process.
Note, the communication between the environment E and the other entities
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Algorithm 11: VOCMC Protocol Π(L): Create channel
1 Input: messageF from on-chain functionality Fch, messageE from
environment E
2 Upon receive messageE(CREATE, cid, pida, pidb):
3 begin
4 send message(CONSTRUCT, cid, pida, pidb, CODE INC) to on-chain
functionality Fch
5 wait up to 2∆:
6 begin
7 if receive messageF(INITIALIZED, cid) then
8 send message(CREATED, cid, pida, pidb) to E
9 stop
10 else
11 if receive messageE(REFUND, cid) then






18 Upon receive messageE(CREATECONF, cid, pida, pidb):
19 begin
20 if receive messageF(INITIALIZING, cid, pida, pidb) then
21 send message(CONFIRM, cid, pida, pidb) to Fch
22 wait up to ∆:
23 if receive messageF(INITIALIZED, cid) then





in the protocol is modeled as taking no time, or this can be achieved by defining the
allowed communication time ∆ between the parties other than the environment as
long enough to neglect the communication with the environment. Therefore, the
initiating party ppida has to wait up to 2∆ to let the party ppidb complete the
communication for confirmation.
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Algorithm 12: On-chain Functionality Fch: Create channel
1 Data: a vector of party identifiers(p1, ..., pn), initializing list, active list
2 Input: message from the parties
3 Upon receive message(CONSTRUCT, cid, pida, pidb, CODE INC):
4 begin
5 if (vocmccid /∈ initializing list) && (FL.xpida ≥ CODE INC.bpida) then
6 send message(REMOVE, sid, ppida , bpida) to ledger functionality FL
7 send message(ADD, sid, cid, bpida) to ledger functionality FL
8 add the pair (vocmccid, τ0) into initializing list
9 send messageF(INITIALIZING, cid, pida, pidb) to ppidb
10 end
11 end
12 Upon receive message(CONFIRM, cid, pida, pidb):
13 begin
14 if (vocmccid ∈ initializing list) && (FL.xpidb ≥ CODE INC.bpidb) &&
(τ − τ0 ≤ ∆) then
15 send message(REMOVE, sid, ppidb , bpidb) to ledger functionality FL
16 send message(ADD, sid, cid, bpidb) to ledger functionality FL
17 remove the pair (vocmccid, τ0) from initializing list
18 add vocmccid into active list
19 send messageF(INITIALIZED, cid) to ppida , ppidb
20 end
21 end
22 Upon receive message(REFUND, cid, pida):
23 begin
24 if (vocmccid ∈ initializing list) && (τ − τ0 > ∆) then
25 send message(REMOVE, sid, cid, bpida) to ledger functionality FL
26 send message(ADD, sid, ppida , bpida) to ledger functionality FL
27 remove the pair (vocmccid, τ0) from initializing list
28 end
29 end
3.3.3 Local Contract Instance Update
Denote any input to the VOCMC at time t before the expected registration time TE
as mt,0≤t≤TE . The corresponding output to the blockchain network is generated from
Φ(m0,m1, · · · ,mt) where the input to the method Φ(·) is the input sequence till t.
For convenience, we denote the output at time t as Φt, unless ambiguity occurs.
The protocol is described in Algorithm 13. Similar to the channel creation,
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Algorithm 13: VOCMC Protocol Π(L): Contract update
1 Data: round number br, current output Φt
2 Input: messageE from environment E , message from other party
3 Upon receive messageE(UPDATE, cid, pida, pidb):
4 begin
5 compute Sa ← sign(Φt, pida, pidb, br + 1)
6 send message(UPDATE, sid, br + 1, Sa) to ppidb at τ0
7 wait up to ∆:
8 begin
9 if receive message(UPDATEOK, sid, br + 1, Sb) then
10 if valid(Sb) then
11 br = br + 1, create TemTran(t,Φt, br, Sa, Sb)
12 else if receive message(NEGOTIATE,mnr, sid, nr) then
13 if nr < N then
14 mnr+1 ← messageE
15 send message(NEGOTIATE,mnr+1, sid, nr + 1)
16 goto line 7
17 finalize negotiation
18 else
19 m0 ← messageE
20 send message(NEGOTIATE,m0, sid, 0)
21 goto line 7
22 Upon receive messageE(UPDATECONF, cid, pida, pidb):
23 begin
24 if (receive message(UPDATE, sid, br + 1, Sa)) &&(messageE : OK)
&&(valid(Sa)) then
25 compute Sb ← sign(Φt, pida, pidb, br + 1)
26 send message(UPDATEOK, sid, br + 1, Sb)
27 br = br + 1, create TemTran(t,Φt, br, Sa, Sb)
28 else
29 if messageE : NOTOK then
30 m0 ← messageE , send message(NEGOTIATE,m0, sid, 0)
31 wait up to ∆:
32 if (receive message(NEGOTIATE,mnr, sid, nr))&&(nr < N) then
33 mnr+1 ← messageE
34 send message(NEGOTIATE,mnr+1, sid, nr + 1)
35 goto line 31
36 finalize negotiation
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the environment E sends messageE(UPDATE) and messageE(UPDATECONF) in order to
instruct party ppida to initiate the update process and party ppidb to respond,
respectively. The initiating party ppida then signs the bit string comprising the
output Φt, the identifier of both parties, and a round number br (the round number
indicates the current round of update which is in effect increased upon a successful
update) via a public key encryption system, then sends the output and the
signature Sa by an update request.
When receiving the update request, the party ppidb needs another
environment input to determine if the output Φt matches her local record. If there
is no disagreement on current output, and the signature Sa is valid, then party ppidb
will sign the same bit string and send the signature Sb in an UPDATEOK response.
Both parties will create and hold a temporary on-chain transaction
TemTran(t,Φt, br, Sa, Sb).
Different from the off-chain payment channel, there is a particular difficulty
when applying state channel for data verification: a participant may intentionally
refuse to create a transaction with output Φt that may impact its benefit. To do so,
the participant could refuse to respond to the latest UPDATE request and close the
channel immediately. Thereafter, the latest output Φt will never be published to the
ledger. We introduce a negotiation procedure to address this issue. Once party ppidb
refuses to respond to an UPDATE request, the counterpart could initiate negotiation
by sending a request message(NEGOTIATE,mnr, sid, nr), where nr is the round
number of negotiation. A deadline ∆ is set for the other party to respond to the
negotiation. The negotiation could also be initiated if there is a disagreement on the
output, in which case the environment E indicates the disagreement by NOTOK
message.
If a negotiation request is ignored, a TemTran(t, NEGt) will be automatically






















Figure 3.2: State transition in VOCMC. Negotiation reports indicate that the
information might be unreliable, but the details could help the public make decision
by their own judgement.
reaching an agreement, the negotiation will stay open with a new deadline for
further communication, and thus a VOCMC can not close with any negotiation still
ongoing. If the parties could not reach an agreement after N rounds (the maximum
of rounds allowed) of negotiation, a transaction with information of the negotiation
proceedings, TemTran(t+N∆, NEGN∆), will be automatically created and
submitted to the public ledger. This transaction serves as a report of unsolved
negotiation. Fig 3.2 illustrates the state transitions during the execution of the
VOCMC. The transaction of the negotiation report would not serve as the evidence
for a reallocation of the deposit and may be unreliable because it is unwise to accept
the explanation from any one of the parties with disagreement. Nevertheless, the
negotiation report is still a valuable information source in that it provides more
details than regular transactions.
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Algorithm 14: VOCMC Protocol Π(L): Contract registration
1 Data: list of TemTran
2 Input: messageF from on-chain functionality Fch, messageE from
environment E
3 Upon receive messageE(REGISTER, cid, pida, pidb):
4 begin
5 send message(REGISTER, cid, pida, pidb, TemTran
T
pida
) to Fch at τ0
6 wait up to ∆:
7 begin
8 if receive messageF(REGISTERING, cid, TemTran
T
pid.br) then
9 wait up to ∆:
10 if receive messageF(REGISTERED, cid, TemTran
T
pid.br) then
11 mark TemTranTpid as REGISTERED
12 else








18 Upon receive messageE(REGISTERCONF, cid, pida, pidb):
19 begin








22 wait up to ∆:
23 if receive messageF(REGISTERED, cid, TemTran
T
pid.br) then




3.3.4 Contract Instance Registration
The local protocol instance (see Algorithm 14) maintains a list of temporary
transactions in its local storage. Recall that temporary transaction
TemTran(t,Φt, br, Sa, Sb) is a contract instance containing the output Φt that could
be uploaded to the public ledger (thereafter, a temporary transaction will be
denoted as TemTranT ). The procedure to submit a TemTranT to be mined and
appear on the ledger and thus available to the public is called “contract instance
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Algorithm 15: On-chain Functionality Fch: Contract registration
1 Data: registering list
2 Input: message from the parties





5 if valid(signaturepida) && valid(signaturepidb) then
6 if TemTranTpidb ∈ registering list then








9 wait up to ∆
10 end
11 else
12 add (TemTranTpida , τ0) into registering list
13 send messageF(REGISTERING, cid, TemTran
T
pida
) to ppida and ppidb
14 wait up to ∆
15 end
16 remove TemTranTpid from registering list
17 register TemTranTpid
18 send messageF(REGISTERED, cid, TemTran
T
pid.br) to ppida and ppidb
19 end
20 end





23 if (TemTranTpida ∈ registering list) && (τ − τ0 ≥ 2∆) then
24 remove TemTranTpid from registering list
25 register TemTranTpid
26 send messageF(REGISTERED, cid, TemTran
T
pid.br) to ppida and ppidb
27 end
28 end
registration” [42]. Registration could be invoked anytime the newest TemTranT is
unregistered. An enforced registration point is the channel closure, where the latest
TemTranT must be registered.
The environment E instructs the party ppida to initiate the registration
process and the party ppidb to respond, respectively. Upon the initiating instruction,
party ppida sends to the on-chain functionality Fch the REGISTER message, which
contains the latest TemTranT , i.e., if there are multiple un-registered temporary
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transactions, take the latest and ignore the rest.
The on-chain registration functionality (Algorithm 15) verifies the validity of
the signatures. If valid, the temporary transaction TemTranT will be added to the
list of transactions under the registration process (whose members are currently
unregistered), and a REGISTERING will be sent to both parties. Party ppida resets the
timer upon receiving the REGISTERING message, while party ppidb immediately sends
its own copy of the latest temporary transaction TemTranTpidb as a reaction. If both
the copies from party ppida and party ppidb contain the same round number br, the
functionality Fch then removes the temporary transaction from the registering list
and proceeds it into the mining process. Then, it sends the REGISTERED message to
both parties. A different round number indicates a dispute situation, which has to
be settled by determining the largest round number br. The temporary transaction
with the largest br is submitted for mining. In case party ppidb did not respond to
the registering request, party ppida could force the registration of her own version of
the temporary transaction, if a timeout is triggered after receiving the REGISTERING
message from the on-chain functionality Fch, by sending a FINALIZE message.
3.3.5 Channel Closure
In order to close a VOCMC channel, the latest temporary transactions must be
registered. Therefore upon receiving the messageE(CLOSE) from environment E , the
protocol instance (see Algorithm 16) of party ppida will firstly check if the
TemTranTE is marked as registered. If true, then send message(CLOSE, cid) to
on-chain functionality Fch to initiate the closure process.
The functionality Fch sends messageF(CLOSING, cid) to party ppidb and waits
up to ∆ for response. Upon receiving the CLOSING message, if her own version of
the latest temporary transaction is NOT registered, party ppidb should reply with a
NOTCLOSE message to stop the closure process for the chance to register the
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Algorithm 16: VOCMC Protocol Π(L): Close channel
1 Data: list of TemTran
2 Input: messageE from environment E
3 Upon receive messageE(CLOSE, cid, pida, pidb):
4 begin
5 if TemTranTE marked REGISTERED then
6 send message(CLOSE, cid) to F
7 wait up to 3∆:
8 if receive messageF(CLOSED, cid) then





14 Upon receive messageE(CLOSECONF, cid, pida, pidb):
15 begin
16 if receive messageF(CLOSING, cid) then
17 if TemTranTE marked REGISTERED then
18 wait up to ∆:
19 if receive messageF(CLOSED, cid) then
20 send message(CLOSED, cid, pida, pidb) to E
21 end
22 else





temporary transaction. Otherwise, party ppidb just sets a timer to wait for
additional messages.
If a timeout is triggered after sending the CLOSING message, the functionality
Fch will execute the incentive function to reallocate the frozen balance according to
the evidence vector (ev1, ..., evn), remove vocmccid from the active channel list, and
send messageF(CLOSED, cid) to both parties. When received the CLOSED message,
the protocol instances of the parties then signal the environment E the success of
channel closure for further instructions.
Note, we do not inline the registration process into the channel closure
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Algorithm 17: On-chain Functionality Fch: Close channel
1 Data: active list, a vector of evidence(ev1, ..., evn)
2 Input: message from the parties
3 Upon receive message(CLOSE, cid):
4 begin
5 send messageF(CLOSING,cid)
6 wait up to ∆:
7 if receive message(NOTCLOSE, cid) then
8 stop
9 else
10 execute Inc(ev1, ..., evn)




protocol for a concise description. It is the users’ responsibility for settling any
unregistered temporary transactions and open negotiations. The functionality only
prevents premature channel closure.
3.4 Security Analysis of the VOCMC
3.4.1 Sketch of Universally Composable Security
It is necessary to understand the universally composable security [43] framework in
order to thoroughly examine the security properties of the VOCMC protocol. This
paradigm significantly simplified the discussion of protocol security in case complex
patterns of subroutine and communication are adopted for rich enough
representation of more realistic adversarial behaviors. In such cases, a proof based
on the single execution of a protocol instance cannot ensure its security under
parallel and concurrent composition, e.g., Oblivious Transfer [47, 48, 49] whose
initial definition could not guarantee security when multiple instances executed
concurrently.
Instead of extending the security requirements of the composed protocol (as
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in [50, 51, 52, 53]) which results in ever-growing complexity of definitions, the
universally composable security framework adopts protocols that are secure in
isolation with the additional requirement of universally composability : if a protocol
is secure under isolated execution and universally composable, its combination with
other universally composable protocols is secure as well.
Therefore, we could securely compose complex protocols by combining secure
subroutine protocols through a general composition process. In this section, we only
consider the subroutine composition, which is the primary composing type adopted
in the VOCMC protocol. The crux of this approach is to define the subroutine
protocol in a way that is secure in an interactive environment, i.e., the subroutine
protocol should UC-emulate [43] a trusted ideal functionality that preserves all the
security requirements for the subroutine. Let φ denote the subroutine, and π denote
the ideal functionality, respectively. The protocol φ UC-emulates π, if an
interactive environment E could not distinguish if it interacts with the protocol φ
with the presence of an adversary A in the real world, or interacts with the ideal
functionality π with the presence of an adversary S.
Given a protocol φ that UC-emulates π, any party including the adversary
could not gain more information from an instance of φ than an instance of the ideal
functionality π, since adversary A here takes the place of the interactive
environment E . To define universally composable protocols, besides carefully
protecting the secrets by the ideal functionality, the communication sequence and
timing should be preserved in both the real and ideal world, which is the main effort
when sketching the constructive security proof. Typically, the ideal world adversary
S should be constructed capable of relaying the communication flow between the
corrupted parties and the environment and determine the delay of the
communication channel.
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3.4.2 Security of VOCMC
The security proof of VOCMC is relatively straight forward since the subroutines
related to security requirements mostly rely on on-chain functionalities, thus avoid
the difficulty of handling secure computations coordinated with the corrupted
parties. The ideal functionality could be directly replaced by on-chain functionality
without an impact on the security of protocols since the on-chain computation is
supposed to be executed in a secure environment. The assumption of a secure
execution environment of blockchain is based on its fundamental assumption of
decentralized computation resources. It is equivalent to run the secure core of the
protocol by a trusted third party (note, there is no trusted mining node in the
blockchain network, but the network as an entity is trusted). As a consequence, the
security proof is reduced to relaying the communication between the environment
and the parties, which is straight forward. The detailed construction of the message
relay could be found in [42]. This section will discuss some remarkable features of
the functionalities.
Fairness of update. Since there is no secret involved in the message
exchange process except the encryption key, we do not consider the fairness of
information closure in this case. Remember that the initiating party of the update
process will send its own signature along with the initiating message to its
counterpart, who could intentionally not respond with the other signature required
for creating the temporary transaction. As a result, the initiating party could not
create the latest temporary transaction, while its counterpart could. In the current
setting, this flaw of fairness does no harm the protocol, because only when a party
intends to publish the output, she would initiate the update process. This flaw
would not lead to blockage of information publication. The fairness of updates could
be achieved by introducing an on-chain functionality for fair signature disclosure.
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Registration security. Different from off-chain payment channel,
registration of temporary transaction would not always lead to deposit reallocation,
and thus is balance secure. The dispute-like procedure adopted in the protocol is for
confirmation of the agreement on the published information and provides an
opportunity to identify data inconsistency. Note that the submitted transaction
should contain signatures of both parties and has a greater round number, and the
channel would not be closed after a registration; therefore, the registration of an
older temporary transaction would not prevent the latest from registration.
Channel closure and balance security. The fairness of channel closure is
critical in the VOCMC protocol because, upon the closure of a channel, any
unpublished information would be lost, and the frozen balance would be distributed
by the incentive function. If there is any unregistered temporary transaction or
unsolved negotiation, it is possible that the incentive function is executed based on
incomplete or outdated evidence vector and thus incorrect balance distribution. In
the current setting, the channel closure could be stopped directly by the
environment intervention or known unregistered temporary transactions. This
provides an opportunity for malicious prevention of channel closure, e.g., prevent
any channel closure if a party is not satisfied with the current potential outcome of
the incentive function. In order to solve this problem, the channel closure process
could depend on the completeness of registration and negotiation. But, a malicious
party could initiate an infinite negotiation process to achieve the same effect. To
avoid this problem, we could introduce an on-chain functionality to freeze the
creation of negotiation. Only the negotiation open at the initiating time of the
channel closure would be taken into account.
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3.5 Other Related Work
The literature on off-chain protocols is rich. A remarkable large portion of the work
focuses on scaling the blockchain in order to enhance its throughput of payment
transactions. Payment channel networks (PCNs) [37, 54] enable the users to route
payment through a network of existing payment channels, thus avoid unnecessary
channel creation among every pair of channel users. PCNs require routing
protocols [55, 56, 57, 58] to optimize the path searching and secure the chained
payment. Commit chain [59, 60] solved this problem without a network of payment
channels but established a pool that money is freely transferred among the
participants. [61, 62, 63, 64] further improved the privacy of the off-chain payment
channel, which is important because the off-chain channel naturally leads to
information concentration related to a small group of users. Arbitrum [65] and
TrueBit [66] scaled smart contract execution by only verifying the signature of
endorsers through on-chain execution, and smart contract execution and verification
are purely off-chain, which is similar to the methodology of our work. Augur [67]
also relies on human knowledge, but allows the users to open a public
decision-making process where any number of participants could join in and provide
inputs to help the process initiator decide the output and collect their payouts.
Another related research area is the oracle system, which aims to provide
data to a blockchain in a more reliable way. However, proposed systems largely
differ in assumptions and applicability. TLS-N [68] focused on data authenticity and
integrity by a modification to the transportation layer security protocol. Similarly,
TownCrier [69] guarantee authenticated data feeding to the blockchain by
employing trusted execution environments [70, 71]. Astaea [72] and Shintaku [73]
leverage on participants’ domain knowledge and a voting scheme to ensure reliable
data feeding to smart contracts.
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From the perspective of game theory, literature analyzed the incentive
mechanism using Nash equilibrium and proposed alternatives depending on different
game constructions. [74, 75] examined incentive compatibility in the presence of
selfish mining behavior of mining pools. [76] improved the proof-of-stake consensus
protocol by incentivizing miners to propagate blocks as soon as possible using the
Stackelberg equilibrium [77]. The Stackelberg game was as well used in [78] to
design a privacy-aware data sharing protocol via blockchain against the security
attacks from the external world.
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Chapter 4
System Design and Implementation
4.1 Introduction
Determining whether an organization complies with the policies is a challenging
task, given the complexity of the current application environment. A data
provenance view is required for dealing with the cross-boundary problem, which is
introduced by the ever frequent storage and process outsourcing. Fig. 4.1 illustrates
a relatively “simple” scenario where a single medical application is described. The
imaginary application employs a social robot that could recognize oral instructions
from human speech and take actions to complete tasks such as searching for music
or traffic conditions. The robot is connected to a PC client and a mobile client for
local configuration, control, and application interface. The robot provider maintains
a data warehouse for storage of the user data, and outsource the speech recognition
to a SaaS provider who is specialized in natural language processing. The training
data for speech recognition model is acquired from the data warehouse. When the
recognition model is ready, the robot could directly send realtime speech record to
the SaaS for analysis.
In order to leverage the VOCMC, one of the critical facts is the agreement.
Hence, our proposed scheme requires the user, and the service provider could make
an independent judgment on policy compliance. We assume policy compliance
inference engines are deployed at both the user side and the provider side. The
scheme should ensure that the required evidence id sent to both the inference
engines. To achieve this goal, we recommend a sticky-policy-based framework to
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Figure 4.1: High level description of the proposed scheme with example
4.2 Background: Sticky Policy
Policies can stick to data to define allowed usage and obligations as it travels across
multiple parties, platforms, or administrative domains, enabling users to improve
control over their personal information [79]. The sticky policy is a potential
approach for accountable and enforceable policies [80, 2], which is firstly introduced
by Casassa-Mont et al. [80]. Here, the data owner specifies management constraints
that would be attached to the data by establishing contractual relationships
between data owners and service providers. In order to enforce the owner-specified
policies, a trusted authority (TA) is employed to keep the decryption keys of the
encrypted data. To obtain the decryption key, a party must agree to enforce the
policies associated with the data. Typically, the policies are enforced at the
application level and are tend to be enforced at particular points, e.g., at
administrative boundaries. Since the data is released as the decryption key is
released, the data owner loses the control and track over her data after the release
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point. This mechanism is extended by the following work [81, 82, 83].
A similar idea has been used for tracking data flow within cloud
infrastructures [84, 85, 86]. These works adopted the perspective of Information
Flow Control (IFC), a concept that emphasizes more on policy enforcement on
lower level data transfer, e.g., data sharing among applications within a cloud
infrastructure. Particularly, the proposed IFC is a Linux kernel implementation,
which indicates a data-centric paradigm for data management. Traditionally, user
data is controlled by the processing application and invisible to the operating
system, thus in an OS, when data is shared by multiple applications, each
application has to implement its own data control mechanism, which leads to
difficulties in consistent policy enforcement even though they are in the same
system. The IFC, however, applies data control policies at the OS level, which
enables system-wide consistent policy enforcement beyond isolation and application
borders (within an IFC-enforcing world). This methodology indeed separates the
responsibility of data control from applications. How an application accesses and
processes the data is determined and monitored by the OS according to the policies
associated with the data.
Another related technique is Taint Tracking (TT) [87]. An example of TT
used for privacy preservation is to taint sensitive information, e.g., a list of contacts
in mobile phones, and track it through this closed system [88]. Data leaving the
system (i.e., the phone) is analyzed to ensure it does not contain sensitive
information. The tainting mechanism is to propagate tags through any entities that
may contain sensitive information. Since TT is an OS-level mechanism, it could not
know exactly how the data would be used by a program or process. If the sensitive
data is accessed by an instance of an application, the aroused processes will acquire
the data’s tag(s), which taint the processes as sensitive. The resulting output or
outgoing connections may be tainted as well. By monitoring the tainted objects, the
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occurrence of the issues (e.g., a data leakage, an attack) could be detected.
From the perspective of execution model, the sticky policy actually allows a
data-centered approach that encloses allowed methods with the data object. This
scheme could be further extended to define any allowed operation in the policy
descriptor. Sundareswaran et al. proposed a logging system for data sharing in this
paradigm [89]. In their work, the users’ data is encapsulated with executable code
in JAR files. There is a tradeoff between storage overhead and universal
applicability of the sticky policy. For instance, a system for information flow control
uses a tagging mechanism to identify the policies applied to specific user data within
a PaaS cloud [90, 91] . Since the policy recognition and enforcement system is
embedded in the cloud infrastructure, the tag associated with the user data is quite
lightweight, but this policy enforcement could not be applied when data has to
travel across the boundary of cloud infrastructures (e.g., from EC2 to Azure). If the
enforcement code is attached to the data as [89] or [92], the policy application could
be ensured as the data travel through different cloud infrastructures at the cost of
overhead probably higher than the data in concern. Ideally, the most effective way
to implement the sticky policy mechanism is by a protocol standard in which a
header is defined as the policy descriptor, and the processing methods are defined
for the policy agent. We take this paradigm in this work by assuming there is a
standard policy descriptor attached to the user data, and the corresponding policy
agent is deployed through the entities involved in the service provision.
4.3 System Design Overview
4.3.1 Sticky Policy Based Evidence Collection
Our sticky policy mechanism can be illustrated by Fig. 4.2, where part of the data
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Figure 4.2: The sticky policy mechanism that enables policy application and
evidence collection in Fig. 4.1
during its entire life cycle, including transmission, storage, duplication, processing,
and deletion. The policy descriptor defines the applied policies, or allowed
treatments. A policy agent parses the policy descriptor to determine the policies
and configure the execution environment. We do not require that the policy
descriptor should carry the execution module but assume that the mechanism for
policy application is deployed within the policy agent at any cloud infrastructure
involved in the service provision. In addition, the policy agent is required to have a
communication mechanism that sends logging updates to the data owner and the
service providers when the data is touched by any program. This log serves as the
evidence feeding into the inference engines in Fig. 4.1.
Because of its inherent flexibility, the sticky policy enabled scheme is
potential to be adjusted to the ever-growing set of policies. Here, we focus our
scheme on following particular problems.
• Consistent cross-boundary policy application. Since any copy of the
user data is accompanied by a policy descriptor, it is straight forward to
maintain a consistent set of applied policies when the data is moved to
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another sticky policy enabled domain.
• Global view of data distribution. A central problem for auditable policy
compliance is to track all the duplication of the user data through the cloud in
that the data is probably copied by various purposes (e.g., backup, buffering,
process outsourcing, etc.) and some are generated in unexpected ways.
Therefore, the violations might happen by not only malicious behaviors but
also by misconfiguration or failure of exception processing. The sticky policy
enabled logging mechanism could help to discover all the intentional and
unintentional duplications.
• Fair availability of information for policy compliance inference.
VOCMC works when all the participants can make informed decisions to
reach an agreement. Thus, the fairness of information acquisition is a critical
feature. Since the protocol allows lag for the participants to make delayed
decisions, the fairness here is in the sense of a unique view of available
information. The sticky policy mechanism should guarantee an independent
“push” notification for all the participants.
Fig. 4.1 outlines the high-level design of our proposed public ledger of policy
compliance. The logging mechanism independently provides evidence to policy
compliance inference engines on both the user side and the provider side. According
to the outputs of the inference engines, the user and the provider reach an
agreement on compliance or violation. Finally, the agreement will appear on the
blockchain (may not in the form of the original record).
4.3.2 Public Blockchain Versus Private Blockchain
The public ledger is recommended to adopt the public blockchain system. The
reason is that the major benefit of blockchain is its immutability and no trusted
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authority involved. This property depends on the assumption of the independence
of the miners and the fact that no (group of) miner controls a dominant computing
power. This assumption probably holds for public blockchain, but not for private
(or permitted) blockchain.
The difficulty in adopting private blockchain as the ledger is that it
essentially introduces a trusted authority. The private chain is owned by, an
organization and the miners have to get permission from the owner. Ricardo N. et
al. [93] pointed out that the only feasible solution for the blockchain-based database
with public auditability is to utilize private BC for the recording, and public
blockchain for the checkpoint. We hold a similar point of view, but realize that the
private BC is a replaceable component, as long as the checkpoint in the public
blockchain is reliable. In a setting where a blockchain is controlled by a trusted
authority, the performance of the blockchain has to be compared with other
distributed database systems.
Note that there are scenarios in which permissioned blockchain is applicable
and probably a better solution than its permissionless counterpart. For instance, a
blockchain-based multi-bank settlement system may adopt permissioned blockchain
because if the participating banks play the role of miners, it is natural that the
miners are independent. In such a system, the population of the miners is under
control and will not decrease and increase frequently. Because of the
non-anonymity, the behavior of the miners is identifiable and detectable.
An observation here is that the assumed attackers in the blockchain-based
system are some malicious block miners. Therefore, if the ledger users are mainly
the miners as well, it is unnecessary to adopt the permissionless blockchain in
practice because they have a direct incentive to guarantee the reliability of the data
and detect any misbehaviors of other miners. For the scenario of this dissertation,
we assume the public is the main data user of the ledger; thus, the interest of the
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miners may be inconsistent with the ledger user. Therefore, we choose the public
blockchain for the ledger.
4.4 Demonstration Cases
This section provides four implementations of policy cases to demonstrate the sticky
policy mechanism as follows,
1. data duplication discovery,
2. guaranteed data deletion,
3. data sharing black and white list, and
4. consent grant and withdraw.
The first two are related to the problem of creating a global view of
cross-boundary data distribution, and the rest are related to the problem of
updating policy across the global data distribution. The sticky policy mechanism is
flexible, because it resembles a container of modules, thus open to extensions. We
do not include access control into the demonstration set in that we attempt to show
the power of this mechanism for cross-boundary policy compliance. Cross-boundary
access control relies on the services in our showcase and could be implemented by
extension.
4.4.1 Shared Communication Protocol and Execution Model
In order to achieve cross-boundary policy compliance, the sticky policy framework
attaches policy descriptors to each applicable file, which makes it difficult to update
the policy descriptors for all the copies of the applicable files at the same time.
























Figure 4.3: If the policy descriptor is updated whenever a policy update request
arrives, some of the duplication can not be discovered by this process. There are
unidentifiable duplications caused by lower level system operations without the
participation of the PA.
to caching, keeping backups, or load balancing. The system is usually unaware of
such “unintentional” duplications, e.g., hard drives might be copied at the operating
system level, and thus there is no opportunity to execute the policy agent at all.
Unintentional copies are generally unidentifiable at the copy time. Fig. 4.3
illustrates this problem.
Lowering the implementation level of the policy agent could mitigate but not
eliminate the unidentifiable duplication, because virtual machines are broadly
applied in present cloud infrastructures. It is impossible to apply fine granularity
data management in such application scenarios, e.g., servers in an IaaS cloud.
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Suppose we implement the policy agent with a list of controlled files. It is
possible to add corresponding entries for copies generated by reaching the policy
agent, which is the PA identifiable duplication in Fig. 4.3. With the presence of the
controlled file list, policy updates could be sent directly to every file in the list. On
the other hand, we could not add the PA unidentifiable duplication into the list of
controlled files, and thus they are not reachable when users update policies.
Another consideration is the performance implication of the policy updating
process. If the policy agent updates the policy descriptors of the controlled files
once it receive a request for policy updating from the users, it will generate frequent
random read/write requests for the file system, which will significantly degrade the
performance of the entire system. One reason is that the files may not be actually
accessed by the processes, and the policy updates will cause additional accesses.
Another reason is that the user data and their duplications may not be stored
consecutively in the storage medium.
Alternatively, we consider fetching policy updates at the access time. First,
any user request for policy updates will be applied to a policy database. Second,
whenever the user data is accessed at the policy agent level, the policy agent will
pull the newest policy set from the policy database, and update the policy descriptor
of the accessed files, as illustrated in Fig. 4.4. Note that the policy database in
Fig. 4.4 is logically resident in the user domain in order to offer a cross-boundary
policy application. The cloud provider could cache part of this policy database into
the local domain of the cloud infrastructure to boost performance.
Another critical problem caused by unintentional copies is duplication
discovery. As mentioned previously, the unintentional copies are unidentifiable by
the policy agent at the copy time and thus not included in the global view of data
distribution. This problem is directly related to the guaranteed deletion service,






























Figure 4.4: The policy update strategy: the policy database will be updated when
policy update requests arrive, but if there is no data access request, the policy
descriptor attached to that data file will not be updated. The policy descriptor will
only be updated at access time.
Similar to the solution of the policy update problem, we expect to discover
duplication only at the access time. The underlying logic is that if a file is never
accessed, it is equivalent to a non-existent file. Hence, we need the policy agent to
send a message to the user domain with information that is able to distinguish every
duplication. We will provide a detailed discussion in a later section. The point here
is that we could combine the message for duplication discovery and policy updates in
a single round communication, and we aim to limit the message communication to a
single round protocol in order to minimize its performance impact. Algorithms 18
and 19 describe the entities’ behavior in this communication and execution model.
We introduced an entity data owner agent or user agent UA, which is a
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Algorithm 18: Pseudo code of a policy agent PA
1 receive request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, ACCESS)
2 send request(idowner, pid, fid, STATUS) to user agent UAowner
3 wait response(idowner, pid, fid, UPDATE) from user agent UAowner
4 upon receive response(idowner, pid, fid, UPDATE)
5 update the policy descriptor of (idowner, fid) with UPDATE
6 send response (idowner, pid, fid, ALLOWED OPERATION)
7 to the process ppid
Algorithm 19: Pseudo code of a data owner agent UA
1 receive request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, STATUS)
2 update(fid,STATUS) to file list
3 read(fid,UPDATE) from policy database
4 send response(idowner, pid, fid, UPDATE) to policy agent UAidPA
container of the policy database and the global view of data distribution. Especially,
the STATUS contains the necessary information to recognize if a previously
unknown data copy is the target file.
A data file is the minimum object that a policy set is applied. All the copies
of the data file share the same policy set. We use fid to identify a group of files,
which are copies of the same file, and share the same applicable policies. Additional
information provided by STATUS distinguishes the copies in a filegroup.
The pid indicates the entity that requests the data access. Be aware that
pid here is a generic identifier that is better to be considered as an information
container with a globally unique identifier. It may contain information that
determines the policies to apply. In practice, this field may include domain
identifier, user identifier, application identifier, system information, etc. The pid is
used here for concision and capture the essence.
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4.4.2 Case 1: Data Duplication Discovery
It is critical to discover any unintentional copy in order to create a global view of
data distribution. As described in Section 4.4.1, the system discovers duplication at
the accessing time via the information carried by the STATUS field in the request.
In the meantime, intentional and unintentional duplication should be treated in a
uniform way. It is clear that if the policy agent does not report copy operation to
the user agent at the copy time, there will be no difference between intentional copy
and unintentional copy. Therefore, it is unnecessary to differentiate these two types
of duplication and specify corresponding system behaviors.
The data duplication discovery subsystem takes into account the following
design points:
• A copy carries exactly the same information as its source. At the
copy time, both the data file and its policy descriptor will be duplicated. As a
consequence, from the view of the user agent, any duplication is
indistinguishable from its source, and the system could not rely on the
information of the file’s initial policy descriptor, such as the fid field.
• This process should be a single-round protocol. This requirement is to
minimize the communication overhead introduced by the mechanism. Also,
the system should minimize the size of the communicated message.
• Messages could carry invalid information. The system should filter out
invalid duplication information. For instance, an attacker could inject fortified
copy information into the data distribution view without actually possessing
the data file. When the user requests data deletion according to the
distribution view, it will trigger a policy violation.
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Algorithm 20: Pseudo code of user agent UA for duplication discovery
1 init: L← ∅
2 function: fileupload(file)
3 HASHfid ← hash(file)
4 Gfid.add(HASHfid)
5 L.add(fid, Gfid)
6 send (idowner, file, fid, HASHfid) to policy agent PAidPA
7 receive request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, STATUS)
8 if L.search(fid).G.search(STATUS.prehash) then
9 if verify(file, STATUS.timestamp,
STATUS.rnd, STATUS.curhash) then
10 L[fid].G[STATUS.prehash].HASH ← STATUS.curhash
11 else return INVALID
12 else L[fid].G.add(STATUS.curhash)
13 send response(idowner, pid, fid, ACC) to policy agent PAidPA
The resulted process is described in Algorithms 20 and 21, when the user
agent initializes a list of controlled files. When uploading files to cloud providers by
invoking fileupload(), the function will generate an initial hash and create a file
group for the uploaded file. The hash is used as the identifier for the initial copy in
the filegroup.
Since the policy descriptor will be copied at the copy time, the system has to
create a copy identifier at the access time (see Algorithm 21). More specifically, the
policy agent will hash the data file with the current timestamp and an additional
random number. The random number is introduced corresponding to the situation
in which multiple copies get accessed at the same time. The timestamp, random
number, newly generated hash value, and previous hash value will be included in
the STATUS field of the request sent to the user agent.
Upon receiving a request, the user agent will search the controlled file list L
by fid. If an entry is found, then search the corresponding copy group Gfid using
STATUS.prehash (at this point, the user agent does not know the newly generated
hash). If the corresponding entry is found for STATUS.prehash, update that entry
with STATUS.curhash, which is the treatment for a previously known copy. Before
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Algorithm 21: Pseudo code of policy agent PA for duplication discovery




5 STATUS.curhash← hash(file, STATUS.rnd, STATUS.timestamp)
6 send request(idowner, pid, fid, STATUS) to user agent UAowner
7 wait response(idowner, pid, fid, ACC,UPDATE) from user agent UAowner
8 upon receive response(idowner, pid, fid, ACC,UPDATE)
9 update the policy descriptor of (idowner, fid) with UPDATE
10 HASHfid ← STATUS.curhash
11 send response
(idowner, pid, fid, HASHfid, ALLOWED OPERATION)
to the process ppid
the update, the STATUS.curhash should be verified to guarantee its validity.
According to the way of hash generation, this process could filter out the fortified
request without actually holding a copy of the file.
If there is no entry in the copy group Gfid for the STATUS.prehash (this
will happen when a copy is accessed after its source file was accessed, vice versa), it
indicates a previously unknown duplication has been found. Therefore, the system
will add a new entry to the filegroup Gfid with STATUS.curhash. Note that, at
the copy time, the source file and its copy are equivalent, and the system has to
update the file’s hash at every access time to differentiate each copy. Essentially,
each duplication is identified by its access pattern.
The policy agent PA could only update the HASHfid for a particular copy
upon receiving the ACC response in order to avoid inconsistency between policy
agent and user agent. A subtle point is when the ACC response is missing. It may
indicate two situations:
• the request is not received by the user agent, and
• the ACC response is not received by the policy agent.
To settle this problem, we could set a timer on the UA side when sending the
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ACC response. If the same request is received before the timer is expired, the UA
will just resend the response. The PA will also set a timer when sending the request.
If the ACC response is not received before the timeout, the PA has to resend the
request. This mechanism is not included in the algorithm description for concision.
4.4.3 Case 2: Guaranteed Data Deletion
Guaranteed data deletion could also refer to secure data deletion [94], data being
forgotten [95], sanitized [96, 97], etc. Most of the works focus on physically erasing
data from the storage media. In their setting, data can be considered as securely
deleted from a storage system, if an adversary with access to the system is not able
to recover the deleted data [94, 98, 99]. Some researchers further require that data
is assuredly deleted when it becomes inaccessible to anyone permanently after it has
been deleted [100, 101, 102, 103].
Incomplete data deletion is common because typical file deletion only
updates metadata of the “deleted” file (e.g., mark the related storage space as
allocatable), while usually leaving the media unchanged until that space has been
overwritten by new files. For instance, research showed that MSDOS disc
formatting operation only overwrites 0.1% of the data [104]. In the cloud
environment, this issue becomes an even more complex problem due to the
unintentional duplication. Particularly, at the time when the data owner sends a
request for data deletion, it is possible that some unintentional copies are
unidentifiable. If the data has been outsourced to other cloud entities, guaranteed
deletion requires WLAN wide search for the data file, which is impractical.
We did not pursue the enforcement of physical erasion of the data upon
request. Supported by the duplication discovery (see Section 4.4.2), we take a
surveillant approach. Remember that a copy is considered as non-existent, if it has
never been accessed. Therefore, immediate deletion is not required in this system.
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Algorithm 22: Pseudo code of user agent UA for guaranteed deletion
1 init: L← ∅
2 function: filedelete(fid)
3 L[fid].DEL MARK ← DEL PENDING
4 send request(idowner, file, fid, DEL) to policy agent PAidPA
5 receive request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, STATUS)
6 if L.search(fid).G.search(STATUS.prehash) then
7 if verify(file, STATUS.timestamp,
STATUS.rnd, STATUS.curhash) then
8 L[fid].G[STATUS.prehash].HASH ← STATUS.curhash
9 if L[fid].DEL MARK == DEL PENDING then
10 if L[fid].G[STATUS.curhash].DEL == false
11 L[fid].G[STATUS.curhash].DEL← true
12 else return POLICY VIOLATION




17 send response(idowner, pid, fid, DEL) to policy agent PAidPA
Instead, our goal is auditable and transparent data deletion, i.e., the system could
monitor the data deletion operation and discover undeleted copies in the future.
Physical deletion is irrelevant in this system, because any data access is reported to
the user agent by the policy agent. If supposedly already “deleted” data gets
accessed, the data owner will catch this event, which will trigger a policy violation.
Algorithms 22 and 23 describe the logic of this component. Similar to
duplication discovery, the deletion takes place at the access time in effect. The
method filedelete(fid) only marks the copy group Gfid as DEL PENDING.
When a request arrives for accessing copies in a DEL PENDING group, the user
agent checks whether this is the first access request towards this copy after the
filedelete has been called. If it is the first time, then set its deletion mark as
true; otherwise, issue a POLICY V IOLATION event.
Since it is possible that unidentifiable copies exist after a file is “deleted”, the
system should be open to newfound copies. Whenever a new copy is recognized, add
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Algorithm 23: Pseudo code of user agent UA for guaranteed deletion




5 STATUS.curhash← hash(file, STATUS.rnd, STATUS.timestamp)
6 send request(idowner, pid, fid, STATUS) to user agent UAowner
7 wait response(idowner, pid, fid, ACC,UPDATE) from user agent UAowner
8 upon receive response(idowner, pid, fid, DEL)
9 update the policy descriptor of (idowner, fid) with DEL
10 HASHfid ← STATUS.curhash
11 send response (idowner, pid, fid, HASHfid, DEL) to the process ppid
it to the group and mark it as deleted. For all these situations, the user agent
should uniformly respond to the access request with DEL to notice the deletion to
the policy agent.
Upon receiving a DEL response, the policy agent has to send the request
process a DEL response. We have not defined the behavior of request processes
upon receiving DEL responses, but since any access has to take place via the policy
agent, access to “deleted” files will be detected and trigger policy violations.
Though this model does not actively delete files upon request and delay the
deletion to the next access request, it will not conflict with the common usability
practice. The user interface could invoke access requests right after the
filedelete() method has been called. This treatment will delete known
duplications immediately.
4.4.4 Case 3: Black/White List for Data Sharing
Black/White list is the showcase of the customizable policy set of the system. We
have to first differentiate two types of data sharing because of the discrepancy
between access patterns:
• A local process p draws and sends part of the data to the request process.
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This access pattern could occur when the user data can be viewed as a list of
entries, and only a few entries will be used at a time, e.g., machine learning
algorithms.
• Send a copy of the target file to the request process. This access pattern
usually occurs when sharing multimedia data, or for load balancing purposes.
The first type could be implemented inside the policy agent by a built-in
attribute-based access control mechanism. PA returns required data entries
according to the applied polices. Since the request process could not acquire full
accessibility to the data, it is not file-level data sharing. This type of data access
could be considered as a procedure in which a process with file-level accessibility
serves as an access agent providing data service to other processes.
The focus of this section is the second type, file-level data sharing, which is
usually related to cross-boundary data sharing. The policy agent has to send the
entire file, including the policy descriptor, to the request process. In essence,
file-level data sharing will create a new copy for the domain who initializes the
sharing request, so the overall method heavily depends on the duplication discovery
mechanism. Note that the policy descriptor could only regulate the behaviors
assisted by the policy agent; thus, the duplication discovery is critical for cases in
which the function of policy agent is bypassed in some way.
The black/white list is not enforced by the system, however, the system will
detect policy violations. Data shared with a third party domain has to be accessed
through the policy agent resident in that domain. Thus the user agent could detect
any access request from domains that are blacklisted by the policy configuration.
The behavior of the user agent for data sharing follows the general treatment
described in Algorithm 19 (see section 4.4.1), and the policy agent is defined in
Algorithm 24. Notably, the user agent will not react to the data sharing request
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Algorithm 24: Pseudo code of a policy agent PA for data share
1 receive request(idowner, idPA, iddomain, pid, fid, SHARE)
2 send request(idowner, pid, fid, STATUS) to user agent UAowner
3 wait response(idowner, pid, fid, UPDATE) from user agent UAowner
4 upon receive response(idowner, pid, fid, UPDATE)
5 update the policy descriptor of (idowner, fid) with UPDATE
6 if isblacklisted(iddomain) then
7 send response (idowner, iddomain, pid, fid, REJECTED) to
ppid
8 else send response (idowner, iddomain, pid, fid, ALLOWED) to
ppid
differently from other requests, though data sharing will lead to additional
duplications.
In fact, the user agent does not distinguish the type of requests except for
the request for consent (see section 4.4.5). The black/white list is only part of the
policy set and will be returned to the policy agent though the policy update
UPDATE. Therefore, the user agent will not create any representative for the
possible new duplications at this moment; however, if the request regards some
unknown duplications that have already existed, the UA will treat it through the
duplication discovery service.
4.4.5 Case 4: Consent Grant and Withdraw
User consent for data usage is an important feature for data service not only
because of the increasing awareness of privacy protection of the public, but also
regulations are established to enforce the transparency of data usage and allow the
data owners to decide how their data will be used.
The grant and withdrawal of consent are different from other policy requests
in that it is a process initiated by the service provider to require additional privilege
from the data owner. In previous cases, the policy agent could only passively check
the policy database for allowed operations or data sharing domain. The consent
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Algorithm 25: Pseudo code of a policy agent PA for consent grant
1 receive request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, CONSENT )
2 send request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, STATUS,CONSENT ) to UAowner
3 receive response(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, CONSENT )
4 notify the process ppid with (idowner, fid, CONSENT )
Algorithm 26: Pseudo code of a user agent PA for consent grant
1 receive request(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, STATUS,CONSENT )
2 update(fid, STATUS) to file list
3 consent ← user input
4 update(consent) to policy database
5 send response(idowner, idPA, pid, fid, CONSENT ) to PAidPA
mechanism allows the policy agent to purpose more operations intended to apply
but not yet allowed by the current policy set.
The consent withdraw could be implemented by mechanisms we have already
defined; thus, we have not defined a specific procedure for consent withdrawal. It
can be done in two ways:
• Reduce the allowed operations though the policy updates. This
method is recommended for fine granularity consent control. Since the user
agent could update the policy database anytime without interaction with the
cloud provider, consent withdrawal is under control by the data owner.
• Delete data from the cloud infrastructure. This method removes data
from the cloud storage space and blocks any operation request from the
process in the cloud.
For consent grant, a specific request and corresponding behaviors are defined
as Algorithm 25 and Algorithm 26.
Because the request for consent grant needs human interference, the policy
agent will not wait on response right after the request is sent, but asynchronously
process the response. We use notify() to differentiate this process from the ones
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Figure 4.5: Data structure of the policy descriptor prototype. Except for the policy
language block and the domain history block, every field is with fixed length. The
policy language block is a variable length field whose length is determined by the
language block length field. the domain history block is a variable length field whose
length is determined by the domain history block length field.
that wait on responses. On the side of the user agent, standard duplication
discovery will be conducted, which is represented by update(fid, STATUS) in
Algorithm 26. Then, prompt the data owner for input and update the policy
database according to user input. Therefore, the cloud provider has to send
requests for consent grant and check the policy database later on. We can consider
any policy update is a process of implicit consent grant or withdraw.
How the policy agent handles the response is not essential for the explicit
consent request and left to the request process the responsibility.
4.5 Policy Descriptor Prototype
Based on the policy demonstrations cases, we construct the policy descriptor
prototype whose fields are described below (illustrated in Fig. 4.5).
• Data owner ID. Possible usage of this field is to assist management on the
cloud side. On the other hand, it helps user agents filter out messages that
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received from the socket but aims to other data owners. This field is
recommended to be globally unique, e.g., addresses on a public blockchain.
• Policy agent ID. This field is used to distinguish policy agents, especially in
cases that data is shared by multiple data processors in a single domain.
• File ID. This field is the identifier of a group of duplications belongs to a
data file, i.e., copies with the same file ID contain the same data except for the
policy descriptor.
• Latest file hash. The hash value generated by taking as input the
combination of the data file, the timestamp of the last access, and a random
number. This field serves as the identifier to distinguish copies in a filegroup.
This field will be updated every time it has been accessed, thus this value has
to be synchronized on both sides.
• Last access timestamp. This field is used to record the timestamp of the
last access in order to help verify the file hash. This field has to be updated
whenever the file hash has been updated.
• Nonce. This nonce is the random number that is used to generate the file
hash. The purpose of introducing a random number in the hash generation is
to avoid hash conflict when multiple copies of a single file have been accessed
at the same time.
• Policy agent socket. This field is used for the user agent to create a
communication connection with the policy agent.
• Data owner user agent socket. This field is used for the policy agent to
create a communication connection with the user agent.
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• Deletion mark. This field is used to indicate a copy has to be deleted, which
has two main effects: as the instruction for deletion of the data file on the
policy agent side; as an indicator of policy violation if an access request is
received for a copy marked as deleted.
• Policy language, language version, language length, and policy
language block. The proposed system allows flexibility for policy
representation. Since the policy set is a variable-length list of variable length
content, we do not specify a fixed length for each entry. Instead, the user of
this system could specify a language parser by the policy language and version
field. The language length indicates the offset of the following policy block in
bytes.
• Domain history language, DHL version, domain history block
length, and domain history block. These fields are used to track the
history of data sharing across domains, which is useful, especially for
identifying the origin of a duplication of a data file. Since the request message
is part of the evidence for inference of policy compliance, messages have to be
forwarded to policy agents along the domain history path for fair information
availability. Similar to the policy representation, the user of this system could
specify a language parser by the domain history language and version field.
The domain history block length indicates the offset of the following domain

















































Figure 4.6: The illustration of the concept demonstration prototype
4.6 System Prototype
4.6.1 Off-chain Databases: Evidence and Inference
We have built a prototype system for the public ledger of policy compliance on top
of the demonstration policy set. The policy violations under consideration regard
the guaranteed deletion, black/white list, and consent grant and withdraw. Data
duplication discovery serves as a critical supporting technique. The communication
for policy requests between the user agent and the policy agent is recorded as the
evidence to infer policy violations. Fig. 4.6 illustrates the structure of the prototype
of the ledger of policy compliance.
The off-chain database is comprised of two levels and should be maintained
on both the data owner side and the cloud provider side:
• The evidence database. It keeps the most detailed records regarding policy
[89]
compliance. Particularly, the prototype system records the request and
response messages between the user agent and the policy agent. Note that the
request and response mechanism could not generate exactly the same view on
both sides. To understand, imagine the scenario of cross-boundary data
sharing. From the data owner’s point of view, there are requests from policy
agents of multiple domains. However, each policy agent only holds its own
requests and response. As a result, the policy agent could not detect some
violations that could be detected by the user agent. For fairness of
information availability, requests and responses should be forwarded to policy
agents along the domain history path.
• The policy compliance database. It keeps the output of the policy
compliance inference engine. The hash that will be submitted to the VOCMC
for agreement is calculated from this database. Although the evidence
database could create the same view on both sides, the two views are not the
same bit-by-bit, which is not suitable for hash functions. The data owner and
the cloud provider, in fact, reach an agreement on both the updates to the
police compliance database and its renewed hash.
We use the on-chain hash as an immutable checkpoint of the police
compliance database. Both sides confirm the content of the database and sign
on-chain transactions through the VOCMC. When retrieving data from the
compliance database, the ledger user could verify its integrity by comparing its
on-chain checkpoint with calculated data hash.
4.6.2 VOCMC Configuration
Suppose the Ethereum blockchain or that with equivalent expressiveness of Turing
completed language is the ledger for the on-chain transactions. The user and the
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provider transfer deposits into a 2-of-2 multi-signature address to open a VOCMC
for pairwise recording. The deposit could be part of the payment for the service
provider, which would be transferred to the provider’s address at the end of the
service provision according to the incentive model. The incentive model is
implemented by the smart contract. Every time an update to the database arrives,
all the parties should sign a temporary transaction that contains the hash of the
renewed view of the database when reaching an agreement on the updated states.
Regarding the finalization, our design choice is that the channel would be
closed when finalizing a record, with the redistribution of the deposit. The reason
for the decision is first that the on-chain cost is almost the same no matter what
kind of transaction is processed, and secondly, that finalization could be caused by
dispute where deposit must be redistributed. The current design processes the
finalization uniformly. If the finalization is triggered by the timeout TE and the
service continues, the deposit will be transferred to another 2-of-2 address as
opening another VOCMC. Figure 4.7 illustrates the ideal case in which all the
participants are honest. The VOCMC output to the BC periodically to set
checkpoints on-chain. During the finalization, the smart contract for the incentive
model would be executed by the miners at the cost of the service provider1.
The objective of the proposed public ledger is to serve as a credit record of
service providers to provide a guide to the customer for informative decision
making, just as the personal credit record helps banks make decisions on loan. A
lesson learned from the current credit records is that mistake is not absolutely
unacceptable, no correction is. The commercial bank would not report a default
once it happens, but provide to the customer a time period to make a late payment
or take other acceptable actions. Similarly, GDPR does not require the data
1This is not required. If the policy compliance database is maintained by a third party, the cost
for on-chain computation could be paid by the third party as it joins the VOCMC by a 3-of-3 multi-
signature address. Moreover, any operation cost will finally be transferred as part of the service
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Figure 4.7: High level description of the public ledger with example of continuous
service
processor to be absolutely secure. The organizations are allowed time to react to the
event and notify the data leakage to the users in order to minimize the damages.
The negotiation functionality supports this critical feature for a practical solution.
Data or privacy leakage could take place during the process not only because of the
intentional malicious behavior of the organization but also because of
misconfiguration or attacking from outside. Besides providing an approach to
address disagreement, the negotiation of the VOCMC could also serve as a buffering
mechanism to allow the data processing organizations to take corrective actions or
restoring their defensive system.
4.6.3 Anonymity
The BC community promotes anonymity as the default for any BC application in
order to protect the privacy of the users. Because of public visibility, the users’
detailed activities could be reconstructed, if identities are not properly treated. The
basic approach for anonymity in a BC system is to strictly abandon address reuse,
that is, an address can only be used for exactly one transaction, regardless of
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representing a receiver or a sender. Note that anonymity provides on-chain
privacy [20], that is, transactional privacy is provided against the public unless the
contractual parties themselves voluntarily disclose information.
In our scheme, we embrace the anonymity of the data owner, i.e., the user of
the data service. However, to enable auditability, we intentionally allow the reuse of
service provider addresses. A service provider benefits from reusing an address for
all activities related to a certain business since a trackable history record of good
performance helps marketing. On the other hand, if a potential customer is given a






The system scales blockchain-based application by reducing unscalable on-chain
operation without sacrificing the information reliability we desired from the
blockchain system. Therefore, the purpose of the experiments is to demonstrate the
capability of off-chain computation to replace on-chain computation. We ran the
policy agent on a MacOS based machine, which is equipped with a 64-bit 3.1 GHz
dual-core Intel Core i7-5557U processor, 16 GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM, 512 GB
SSD, and 100 Mbit/s ethernet connection. The user agent is run on a MacOS based
machine which has a 64-bit 2.7 GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 processor, 8 GB 1867
MHz DDR3 RAM, 256 GB SSD, and 100 Mbit/s ethernet connection. The use of
CPU core is set to be the single-core mode for consistent measurement. The
on-chain operations are tested on Ropsten testnet, whose behavior is supposed to be
similar to the Ethereum main network.
5.2 Baseline Spacial Overhead
The cost of the entire system includes the overhead introduced by the sticky policy
mechanism to data access and data process and the cost of the execution of the
VOCMC protocol. In this section, we discuss the spacial overhead of sticky policy
and VOCMC message.
5.2.1 Policy Descriptor
The prototype relies on the Recursive Length Prefix (RLP) [105] to create the
headers and messages; thus, the length of each field of the header could be of
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Header Field Length (bytes)
Data Owner ID 8
Policy Agent ID 8
File ID 8
Last Access Timestamp 8
Policy Agent Socket 10
Data Owner User Agent Socket 10





Language Block Length 8
Policy Language Block NA
Domain History Language 8
DHL Version 8
Domain History Block Length 8
Domain History Block NA
Total 137+
Table 5.1: The length of the fields in policy descriptor of sticky policy
flexible length. For each field, the RLP will prefix two bytes to set the boundary
and indicate the length of the field. For a payload of more than 55 bytes long, the
RLP encoding adds 2+ bytes to indicate its length. Therefore, for the prototype, we
construct the policy descriptor described in section 4.5 for the cost of 137+ bytes
payload (see Table 5.1) and 34+ bytes for the cost of RLP. The uncertainty of the
header length is because of the variable length fields, Policy language block, and
Domain history block. The fields for IDs, timestamp, and length are of the long
integer, which is of the size of 8 bytes. Note that big integer could be used to
replace the long integer, if necessary. All the fields are determined to create a
prototype with a reasonable setting in which the size of each field is by no means
the only option.






Digest of Policy Compliance/Negotiation 32
Round Number 8
Requestor Sign Mark 1
Requestor Signature 41




Table 5.2: The length of the fields in VOCMC message
We assume the policy block only contains a B/W list of domain names, and the
B/W list consists of 10 items. As well, the domain history block is assumed to
comprise 10 domain names. To estimate a realistic overhead of the policy
descriptor, we pad these block with bytes of the average length of domain names,
which is approximately 10 characters [106], and neglect the cost of the imaginary
languages. The resulted policy descriptor is of length 377 bytes
(137 + 34 + 100 + 3 + 100 + 3, the 3 bytes is for the RLP cost of string longer than
55 bytes). If the user data file is a jpeg image of size 2MB, the spacial overhead
introduced by the policy descriptor approximate 0.019%. We use this pseudo-header
for further performance experiments.
5.2.2 VOCMC Message
Table 5.2 illustrates the minimum construction of VOCMC message fields to
implement the required behaviors described in chapter 3, but a particular message
only carries a subset of these fields.
The possible message type with the largest size is the negotiation message,
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which includes the addresses of requestor and responder, message type, digest of
negotiation history, round number, and a variable-length field negotiation block.
The total number of fixed bytes for a negotiation message is 81 + 10 + 3 = 94 bytes,
in which the extra 10 bytes are the RLP cost for regular length byte array, and the
other 3 bytes are for byte array longer than 55 bytes. All the other message types
are with a fixed message length.
The most frequently used message type is the messages for off-chain contract
instance update, which consist of a pair of request and response. The request
message comprises 140 bytes, including the addresses of requestor and responder,
message type, digest of policy compliance history, round number, requestor sign
mark, requestor signature, and responder sign mark. In addition to the fields of the
request message, the response message has the responder signature field, thus
results in 183 bytes in total.
The message for contract instance registration is an on-chain transaction. We
only consider the payload of transaction data involved. A valid registration message
contains all the fields other than the negotiation block and sign marks; thus, the
total message length is 177 bytes no matter the contract registration is for policy
compliance or negotiation.
5.3 Baseline On-chain Cost
On-chain cost consists of transaction fee and transaction confirmation time. We
examine the on-chain cost in the Ropsten [107] network (one of the Ethereum
test-nets). The Ropsten network executes exactly the same code of the Ethereum





Successful channel creation 123,047
Unsuccessful channel creation 157,378
Contract instance registration 237,420
Contract instance registration timeout 212,812
Successful channel closure 142,630
Unsuccessful channel closure 90,231
Table 5.3: The gas cost of on-chain operations
5.3.1 Transaction Fee of On-chain Operations
The transaction fee is measured by Gas, which is kind of the “fuel” to execute code
in the Ethereum network. Every instructions and data storage has a Gas
consumption value. The transaction fee is based on the total Gas consumption of
the transaction. Gas is priced in Gwei (the most-used denomination of Ether, the
cryptocurrency of Ethereum). The transaction fee equals
gas consumption× gas price. For execution, the gas consumption is fixed, but
the user could announce a relatively high gas price to raise the priority of her
transaction. Therefore, we only use gas consumption as an indicator of the
operation cost. Table 5.3 lists the cost of complete execution of the on-chain
operations of VOCMC.
To provide a more realistic sense of the on-chain execution cost, consider
1-Gwei gas price and $0.00000014 ether price. Contract instance registration, the
most-used on-chain operation, is priced 0.0332 in US dollar. Thus, frequent on-chain
transaction submission results in high execution cost, which is another constrain
other than performance when building smart contract applications on the public
blockchain.
By design, the on-chain operations consume a fixed number of gas because
each operation only requires a single round protocol. If multiple rounds are
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necessary (e.g., channel closure) for system security, the users should invoke the
operations multiple times and manage it by off-chain logic instead of relying on the
on-chain execution to handle the multiple-round protocol. The reason is that there
is a maximum gas limit imposed by the block miners, non-deterministic execution
risks out-of-gas exceptions.
5.3.2 Ropsten Transaction Latency
The latency of on-chain operation of VOCMC consists of three components, the
transaction confirmation latency, computer-human interaction latency, and
transaction communication latency. We used a message relay contract to measure
the latency of protocol communication through the Ropsten network. The local
client sends a registration transaction and its timestamp to the relay contract.
Upon receiving the transaction, the contract sends the transaction data and
timestamp to the responder address. The responder client uses the timestamp to
measure the latency. We record an average latency of 83.3 ms.
We used the registration operation to measure the transaction confirmation
latency of the Ropsten network. There are two reasons for this decision: 1) contract
instance registration is the most-used operation, 2) contract instance registration
requires no computer-human interaction. This measurement is used to estimate the
scalability of the prototype system. The transaction confirmation latency is
supposed to be 15s to 20s, which is adjusted dynamically by the mining
difficulty [108].
The tester sent 1 transaction per minute for 1000 minutes, and query the
transaction pool to monitor each transaction’s appearance in the pool and take note
of the time. Finally, query the Etherscan [109] to determine the timestamp of when
the transaction eventually gets incorporated into a block. Fig. 5.1 shows how the
transaction confirmation time varies over 100 minutes. In total, we recorded an
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Figure 5.1: Ropsten testnet transaction confirmation time over a 100-minute period.
average confirmation time of 21.25 seconds and a standard variance of 13.89.
Dynamically, the confirmation time varies from less than 10 seconds to around 70
seconds, as seen in Fig. 5.1. Based on this observation, a wide timeout is
recommended for application logic that relies on transaction confirmation.
5.4 Data Access Delay
We measured the data access delay introduced by the sticky policy mechanism.
Intuitively, there are two types of componential delay: 1) the communication delay
between the policy agent and the user agent, and 2) the time to prepare the
message and list checking. Given a pair of communication parties, most of the
delays tend to be consistent, and fluctuation comes from the communication and
execution environment. Only the time complexity of the hash function is O(n)
where n is a parameter related to the size of the data file, i.e., the execution time of
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Figure 5.2: Data access latency introduced by sticky policy.
the hash function increases as the input file size increases. Therefore, besides
measure the overall access delay, this experiment aimed to examine how user file
size impacts the performance.
We traversed different file sizes from 1 KB to 20 MB. For each file with a
given size, the tester accessed the file 1,000 times to record the average delay and
the standard variance. Both the overall delay and the execution time of the hash
function were recorded in order to get the statistics of the consistent component and
the variable component. Fig. 5.2 shows the result of file sizes from 1 MB to 20 MB
with 1 MB step length.
It can be observed from Fig. 5.2 that the execution time of the hash function
starts to dominate the delay around file size of 7 MB. The consistent component is
ranging from 40 to 53 milliseconds, and the variable part is linear to the file size as
expected. The variance of the overall delay is around 9% of the total. The most
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Figure 5.3: Data access latency introduced by sticky policy for small file.
acceptable range of delay is for multimedia files such as images or short video
streams. It might need to be optimized to adjust to larger files. For the files with
relatively small size (e.g., a text file of some KBs), the hash function overhead is
negligible compared to the consistent component, as seen in Fig 5.3.
5.5 On-chain Strategy and Scalability
This section studies the VOCMC’s impact on the scalability of blockchain-based
general purpose ledger. Due to the lack of data access trace from real productive
cloud infrastructure, we could only examine a simulated scenario in order to catch
some insights into the properties of the prototype system. Table 5.4 lists the
simulation configurations for the experiment.
The simulation is designed to capture system behavior similar to our
application scenario, i.e., the public ledger for the policy compliance record of cloud
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Simulation config Value
Total policy compliance report 1,000
Gap between report generation 60-180 sec.
Size of policy compliance report 640 Bytes
Policy violation rate 5%
Pure on-chain recording Upload per report
On-chain off-chain combination 1 Periodic
On-chain off-chain combination 2 Violation driven
On-chain off-chain combination 3 Combine 1 & 2
Table 5.4: Simulation Configuration of Scalability Test
Strategy Uploads Time (s) Gas cost
Pure on-chain recording 1000 22,183 4.25× 108
Periodic (1200 s) 100 1972 2.37× 107
Violation driven 39 919 9.26× 106
Periodic & violation driven 116 2466 2.75× 107
Table 5.5: Simulation results of 4 different strategies
service providers. The policy compliance is assumed to be a non-frequent record. As
an analog, a credit statement is reported on a monthly basis. We choose a 60-180
second gap and 1,000 records for the balance between low frequency and experiment
efficiency. The 640 bytes is a reasonable choice for an informative policy compliance
report. Notably, as the experiments show, these assumptions on original records are
not essential for the performance of the off-chain boosted public ledger.
This experiment compares the on-chain-checkpoint-off-chain-database
structure with pure on-chain data recording. Though the theoretical upper bound of
transaction data is around 780 KB recently, it is not suitable for our scenario
because it will take quite a long time to buffer 780 KB data of only the policy
compliance report. However, it is simple to fill the block with evidence data. Hence,
it is not necessary to reach the upper bound of uploaded data. For the pure on-chain
recording, the tester uploaded every report once it arrived through transaction data.
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We tested 3 strategies for the on-chain-off-chain combination in which only
the hash value of the current accumulated records is uploaded through the contract
instance registration of the VOCMC. The periodic strategy is useful for the most
general-purpose database that set on-chain checkpoint over a specific period of time.
Violation driven strategy is a special variety of event-driven strategies suitable for
our application scenario. The policy violation is the most concerned records for the
ledger user. This strategy guarantees that violations would be published upon their
occurrence. We assume a violation rate of 5%, i.e., every policy compliance report
has a 0.1 chance to be a violation report. The third strategy combines the periodic
and violation driven strategies for both the merits, which is probably the optimized
option for our scenario. Periodically uploading checkpoint is necessary for the daily
operation of a database, and the violation driven offers on-time information
exposure. Specifically, every time when a violation driven uploading is triggered, the
current periodic cycle will be aborted and start a new cycle, i.e., the timer for
periodical uploading will be reset to zero.
Table 5.5 shows the results, where time is the on-chain transaction
confirmation time. The decrease of on-chain cost is not significantly remarkable due
to the relatively small scale of our experiment (still decrease by orders of
magnitude), and the parameter setting (small period). However, this scheme has
more potential because of the decoupling of the on-chain operation and off-chain
recording. Especially, the performance of the periodic strategy is completed
irrelevant to the generation rate of the records. It only depends on the predefined
time period. For example, if the uploading rate were set to be 1/24 hour, there
would only be 2 uploads during the experiment (the run seen in Table 5.5 took a
totally 119,110 seconds, 33 hours). On the other hand, if we had a 100× record
generation rate, the cost of the periodic strategy would still stay the same, as seen
in Fig. 5.4. Once the uploading rate is determined, the number of uploads would be
[104]
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Figure 5.4: Periodic upload is not proportional to the record generation rate. Given
a time period, the number of uploads remains constant, which is determined by an
independent uploading rate.
a constant independent of the number of the records (but related to the uploading
rate).
Though the violation driven strategy outperformed the periodic strategy in
this particular case, the cost is related to the record generation rate. Therefore,
scenarios with a high frequency of events in concern degrade this strategy. The cost
of the combination of these two strategies was more than both the cost of the
strategies, respectively. In fact, all the violation driven uploads were preserved and
did replace part of the periodic uploads, so the combined cost should be greater than
the cost of periodic strategy alone and less than the sum cost of these two strategies.
To conclude, the VOCMC effectively removes the scalability limit when
developing blockchain-based general purpose ledger. The on-chain cost is decoupled



































Figure 5.5: Number of accesses to completely deleted all the copies of file.
of on-chain operation purely according to the acceptable performance and finance
constraints.
5.6 Guaranteed Deletion
We use this case study to examine the effectiveness of the policy application case
supported by our prototype system because guaranteed deletion could also reflect
the performance of the duplication discovery and the consent withdraw. Recall that
a data file will be deleted at the first access after the user agent marks this file as
deleted. As a result, the deletion depends on the access pattern. In this experiment,
we only test the performance under a uniformly random access pattern. Since, in
practice, files may be accessed at very low frequency, even never be accessed, we
counted the number of access between when the deletion was issued and when the
deletion was completed. We assume several copies of the file that would be deleted
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Figure 5.6: The access number required to complete deletion is nonlinear to the
number of copies, growing rapidly for small copy numbers.
are spread in a file system with 10,000 files. We tested the guaranteed deletion on
different numbers of copies, 13 cases from 1-10,000 copies. The total file number in
the file system remained the same, i.e., 10,000 copies means 100% of the files in the
system were copies of the file supposed to be deleted.
Fig. 5.5 shows the results. Notice the labels of the x-axis that the required
number of accesses is not linear to the number of copies. Its functional relationship
can be seen in Fig. 5.6. Under uniformly random access, even just 1 copy needed
10,052 access to hit the copy and complete the deletion. Though uniformly random
access is far from the realistic access pattern in a file system, this is still an
interesting observation, because the unknown duplications could only be touched by
somehow random access if there is no regular scan of all the files in a system. The
access number increased very fast when the copy number was very small, and thus
for most of the realistic scenarios (usually, files would not be duplicated thousands
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of times), the system should erase as many copies as possible through an initial
deletion, i.e., access all the known copies right after the deletion instruction is
issued. Decreasing from 5 copies to just 2 copies could significantly increase the
chance of complete deletion. If a deadline is posted for data deletion, we recommend
scanning the file system regularly to ensure unknown copies could be discovered
before the deadline.
5.7 Conclusion
An innovative approach is proposed for constructing a public ledger of policy
compliance in this dissertation. Particularly, VOCMC is introduced to address the
verification of external information as a critical phase to build a public ledger based
on blockchain technology. We stress that the blockchain is reliable in the sense of
the immutability of on-chain transactions after finalization. However, the blockchain
is lacking instruments to effectively verify external information; that is, it will trust
whatever data provided as input. Therefore, when considering the combination of
on-chain and off-chain architecture, the key is the verification of the information
from the off-chain world. Moreover, the VOCMC displays the potential to further
limit on-chain computation. A reliable verification mechanism for external
information allows depending more on off-chain computations without impacting
the reliability of the outcome.
Particular contributions of this dissertation are as follows,
• We formalized the ledger model and the verification mechanism (self-verifiable
transaction system) of blockchain and proved blockchain’s capability of
internal information verification and its inability to verify information from
the external world, based on our formalization.
• The VOCMC is proposed as the generalized and formalized model of the
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off-chain channel for general purpose recording. Through the concept of
incentive-based trust, we supported the justification of the information
verification mechanism and analyzed the security properties of the VOCMC
under the universally composable security framework.
• A prototype system was designed, in which on-chain hash is leveraged for the
reliable checkpoint, and the VOCMC is used for information verification and
scalability improvement. The sticky policy is employed as a general framework
for policy enforcement and evidence tracking.
• We implemented the concept demonstration prototype with 4 policy
application cases: 1) data duplication discovery, 2) guaranteed data deletion,
3) consent grant and withdrawal, and 4) data sharing black/white list.
• The prototype was evaluated on the Ropsten testnet for the Ethereum
blockchain application. We explored some metrics which confirmed our
expectation on performance and effectiveness. In particular, the decoupling of
the on-chain and off-chain performance allows developers to scale
blockchain-based applications through off-chain components without
sacrificing the reliability of the information.
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